Daily Report

East Europe

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Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-045 *6 March 1996*

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Albania: AD Leader Protests Government 'Abuses'

AU0603084096 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 5 Mar 96 p 4

[Article by Arben Vata: "The State Falsifies Files"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The abuses of the members of the government and the official press in connection with the law on screening personalities and the police attack on the independent newspaper KOHA JONE were two of the reasons impelling Democratic Alliance [AD] President Neritan Ceka to undertake a series of meetings with foreign diplomats accredited to Tirana yesterday.

Authorized by the AD Presidency, Ceka yesterday met EU Ambassador Elio Germanio, the French ambassador, and a representative of the Austrian Embassy, and submitted to them a letter addressed to their respective heads of state that provides details of the exploitation of the "law on the files" for political purposes and gives evidence of the high-handed interference of the police in KOHA JONE.

"Even though the commission for screening political personalities has still not convened, the government and its press have begun to prepare falsified files against various personalities in Albanian political life," a worried Ceka said to the three foreign diplomats. Ceka also cited the Democratic Party newspaper RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE and the accusations it has recently leveled at two AD Presidency members, Ceka and Imami, as examples of direct accusations made by the government press against opposition leaders. Ceka handed to the three ambassadors documentation illustrated with accusatory articles and a denial of having raised these charges by Tanush Frasheri, one of the persons whom the official press has called the denunciator. Ceka said, "The European diplomats understood my condemnation of the government's unprincipled attacks against opposition leaders, and they are increasingly persuaded that the law on screening personalities is not aimed at discredited figures of the communist dictatorship, but that the government is dishonestly using it as a weapon in the political arena." Ceka also informed the ambassadors about the recent police attack on the newspaper KOHA JONE, considering it an outrage against the free and independent press. Meanwhile, Ceka will today hand a detailed file about the slanders and charges leveled against opposition leaders to the Italian and Greek ambassadors, and will ask them to sensitize government and public opinion in their countries.

Albania: Two Newspapers Close After State 'Pressure'

AU0303201996 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 3 Mar 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "AKS and SPORT EXPRES Closed Down"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—The Albanian press will now lose two newspapers. The publishers Nikolle Lesi and Aleksander Frangaj yesterday announced the closure of the newspapers AKS and SPORT EKSPRES. They declared in a press statement that the reason for their decision was the violence and pressure of the state against KOHA JONE. The statement emphasizes that besides detaining and arresting journalists and leveling slanderous accusations of imaginary sponsorship with the aim of discrediting the paper, the state is now using a very effecting means of struggle in the shape of a financial blockade.

"The Albanian and foreign public is now aware," the declaration states, "of the large-scale blockade of the motor vehicles of the 'Press Transport' press distribution enterprise, which is financed by KOHA JONE. This has led to severe losses calculated in thousands of dollars. "Seeing as the state is persisting in its high-handed behavior," the statement of the publishers Lesi and Frangaj continues, "in order not to jeopardize the normal continuation of KOHA JONE, we publishers have decided to suspend the financing of the cultural and arts newspaper AKS and also SPORT EKSPRES, and thus to close them." The continuing saga of several years of clashes between the publishers of KOHA JONE and the state has thus recorded two new casualties. Unfortunately, the extent of this conflict long ago broke out of the framework of a debate between an independent newspaper and the state, which would be normal in an emancipated society. The casualties are therefore those who should not suffer, i.e. the newspapers. For everybody who wishes to see the new press in Albania flourish, the message coming from this tediously prolonged conflict is not a liberating but an extremely painful one.

Albania: Accreditation of Foreign Journalists Approved

AU0303185696 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 1 Mar 96 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Decision on Accreditation of Foreign Journalists Approved"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In order to facilitate information for the international public about Albania and events on the territory of the Republic of Albania and on the

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basis of Article 1 of the Press Law of the Republic of Albania, which states that the press is free, and Article 3 of the same law, which states that the press fulfills a public duty, the Council of Ministers has approved a decision on the permanent and temporary accreditation of foreign journalists and correspondents in the Republic of Albania. This decision permits correspondents of the media of other countries, who may be temporarily or permanently accredited at the Press and Information Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to conduct activities as journalists. The accreditation of foreign journalists and correspondents in Albania is the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Albania. Journalists and correspondents of foreign news agencies and media may be accredited in the Republic of Albania when their work as journalists is their sole source of income in the Republic of Albania. Those who will work for longer than three months will be considered permanently accredited correspondents in the Republic of Albania. They will be based in Tirana, and no foreign correspondent based outside the territory of the Republic of Albania can be accredited. The procedure for accrediting foreign journalists will be completed at the Press and Information Directorate, and requires the presentation of:

a) An application from the publication desiring to accredit its own journalist in Albania, addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

b) A valid passport;

c) The curriculum vitae of the journalist or correspondent seeking accreditation;

d) Two photographs of the journalist.

The Press and Information Directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will testify that foreign journalists are accredited by supplying them with an accreditation card valid until the end of the calendar year. The period of accreditation may be extended for one year if the foreign journalist's activities do not contravene the articles of this decision. Journalists must be accredited before the end of March.

Albania: SP Request for Rally Refused; 'Excuse' Viewed

AU0403145296 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 3 Mar 96 p 3

[Editorial: "No to the Rally Against Terrorism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Socialist Party's [PS] request for a joint rally of representatives of all political forces in the presence of President Berisha himself in order to protest crime and terrorism has been refused. The reason?...

So far we have only been given a very banal excuse: "Skenderbeg Square has not been approved for gatherings, demonstrations, protests, etc." It is clear that it is not the police but those who control them who are against a mass protest rally of citizens regardless of their political convictions or party allegiances. The Socialists' request, first announced by PS Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi at his most recent news conference on Tuesday 27 February, was a highly civil and unprejudiced appeal that was welcomed by the Albanian democratic public and by representatives of other political forces. This was for the simple reason that everybody is ready to combat the crime and terrorism that are claiming the lives of innocent people. Of course, the scope of a rally in the struggle against corruption [as published] is not everything, but the message it would send to the Albanians would be very significant and necessary. However, not everything is in the hands of the Socialists. They sought a rally without any intention of scoring political points before the elections or of politicizing a macabre crime. Setting aside the differences between their manifesto and philosophy and those of other parties as a whole and of President Berisha in particular, the constructive and loyal Albanian Socialists consider cooperation to be necessary at least on this matter, However, the president remained silent!... The Socialists do not take his silence as an insult; nor are they discouraged in their struggle for democracy and progress, and against violence, totalitarianism. crime, and terrorism. Regardless of Berisha's prejudices, the Socialists will support him in every constitutional step he takes to promote democracy, the public peace, order, the safety of people's lives, and the rule of law.

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Bulgaria: Minister Kostov Views 1996 Fiscal Strategy

AU0503092696 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 1 Mar 96 p 14

[Interview with Bulgarian Finance Minister Dimitur Kostov by Stefan Kyuchukov; place and date not given: "Dimitur Kostov: Tax-Free Income May Reach 3,500 Leva per Month"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kyuchukov] Minister Kostov, the budget's macroframework envisions inflation of 20 percent in 1996. Will the government succeed in keeping to this forecast?

[Kostov] As things have evolved over the first six weeks of this year, it is not impossible to achieve this goal. Inflation in January was 2.4 percent. In the last five years, we have never had such low inflation in January. The provisional figures that I have for February inflation in the prices of monitored goods show that the prices have remained unchanged.

Monitoring carried out last year shows that the overall prices index deviates by about 1 percent from the index for monitored goods. However, regardless of the optimistic figures, it is clear that a pledge of 20-percent annual inflation is an ambitious goal that will require much effort to achieve.

[Kyuchukov] What specific measures have to be taken?

[Kostov] Most of them boil down to administering the management of the state companies. We have to tighten financial discipline and make a start on restructuring and rehabilitating the banks and establishing a coordinated economic policy. Last, but not least, the privatization programs must be completed. The success of mass privatization will be of decisive importance, and it is our aim to hold the company auctions as soon as possible. We are counting to a large extent on parliament's support to ensure success. I am thinking not only of the tax legislation, but also of the problems relating to the rules of the game. This relates to a section of the Commercial Law dealing with contracts, bank insolvencies, and so on.

[Kyuchukov] National Assembly deputies claim that the budget deficit will have to be adjusted. Is there any foundation for their fears?

[Kostov] These assertions are overhasty. They are based mainly on the interest rate levels and the cost of servicing the loans. However, they ignore two facts. First, the cost of debt servicing depends not only on the level of the base interest rate. Almost half of the state debt is serviced at the LIBOR international interest rates, which are turning out to be lower than expected. These interest rates are applied not only in servicing the foreign debt, but also part of the internal debt, such as the securities for bad loans denominated in dollars. The exchange rate also affects the cost of debt servicing. We achieved savings when we made our first payment on the foreign debt in January.

The assertions about updating the budget also stem from the proportion of the national budget that goes on debt servicing. It is a fact that 50 percent of the budget is used for interest payments. However, this is not all that the state spends. The state spends over 110 billion leva on social security payments and over 80 billion leva goes to the local authority budgets. Other substantial sums are paid into extrabudgetary accounts, such as the Professional Qualifications and Unemployment Fund.

If one examines the structure of state expenditure, one should include all the expenditures, irrespective of which body makes them. Measured in this manner, the amount spent on debt servicing comprises about 25 percent of all outgoings.

In the course of 1996, the state will collect about 421 billion leva, which is about 38 percent of the GDP. Of these receipts, about 352 billion leva will be spent on public services, and the rest will be used to finance the relevant part of the debt servicing.

[Kyuchukov] The IMF reprimanded us for our high foreign debt. Bulgarian financial experts also urge that it should be reduced. How can this be done?

[Kostov] At the end of 1995, our GDP and foreign debt were 897 billion leva. There is no way of stopping the foreign debt from rising in absolute terms. The point is to stop it growing faster than the GDP. Every economy and every company operates at a certain level of debt. The EU countries are striving to attain a debt level of about 60 percent of the GDP. Most of them have debts in the range of 55 to 80 percent. Italy has a debt that is greater than its GDP.

People who preach that we have to cut the national debt even in absolute terms should complete their idea. They should say that this is the model that Ceausescu applied in Romania in the eighties. In the course of 10 years, the Romanians solved the problem. At the end of 1989, their foreign debt amounted to $100-200 million, which is nothing for a state of this size. However, they were all well aware of the cost of this "delight," and the government does not propose following the same idea this time. When making economic decisions, it is always important to find a balance in conformity with the long-term goals.

The acceleration of privatization, including the use of debt instruments, will help to reduce the debt. This is

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why we continued the practice of offering premiums for bad debt bonds in privatization deals.

[Kyuchukov] The Supreme Court will repeal the Council of Ministers decree that increased property taxes five-fold to 25-fold. Do you already have a bill ready for amending the Local Taxes and Charges Act?

[Kostov] Our proposal to amend the law is ready, and we will submit it to the National Assembly when it becomes necessary. These amendments are authorized by ministerial decree. If the members of parliament approve them, they will contribute almost 100 billion leva to the state budget.

[Kyuchukov] The Finance Ministry is preparing a fundamentally new income tax bill that will come into force on 1 January 1997. How will it differ from the current law?

[Kostov] In 1997, a start will be made on changing the principles of income taxation. At the moment, individual sources of income are taxed. It is our wish to start taxing aggregate incomes. Of course, this cannot be done at a stroke. We have to gradually move toward European principles, but we also have to bear our traditions in mind.

The other basic principle of tax legislation that has now been submitted to the National Assembly is equal treatment of taxpayers. At present most people pay income tax monthly, at the time they receive their incomes, while only some people pay their tax once a year. However, they receive every day the public services that these taxes provide. Things should be looked at overall, considering all their interrelations and mutual dependence. To ensure that we have good police, good education, and so on, we have to finance them on a current basis.

We have proposed a progressive increase in the tax burden. The greatest burden will fall on those with high incomes, while low-income groups will suffer less. Taxes predetermine the national income.

I understand from Ventseslav Dimitrov's suggestion of a minimum tax-free income of 5,000 leva per month that he wants the redistribution to be minimal. This means that he proposes drastic cuts in the public services that the state provides.

Working wages form less than 50 percent of the population's incomes, the rest comes from pensions and interest. Children's allowances and social benefits are not taxed. During the last five years, the share of budget receipts derived from income tax has fallen from 13.3 percent to somewhat less than 11 percent.

[Kyuchukov] National Assembly Deputy Stefan Stoilov has declared that the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] parliamentary group will vote to increase the minimum tax-free earned income allowance for 1996 from the 3,000 leva that the cabinet proposes. How sensible is it to increase this minimum level?

[Kostov] A possibility exists of increasing the tax-free minimum. These things cannot be set in stone. Analyses show that the range of 3,000 to 3,500 leva per month for earned income tax allowances is reasonable. This means that the annual income not subject to tax may reach 42,000 leva.

[Kyuchukov] Is the Finance Ministry already drafting a gambling bill?

[Kostov] Yes, such a bill is being prepared, but we have to determine the public reaction. Accordingly, a certain commitment from parliament is needed. The question concerns not so much concerns the technicalities of drafting the bill as fashioning a law that the public wants.

We have to set the barrier high for the gambling companies. This will mean not only higher minimum capital requirements, but also high ethical demands. Gambling is an activity that should not only be considered from a fiscal viewpoint.

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Czech Republic: Klaus Reacts to Tel Aviv Bombing

LD0503160396 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1500 GMT 5 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Speaking in Zagreb today, Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus commented on the brutual attack carried out by Islamic terrorists in Tel Aviv yesterday.

[Begin Klaus recording] Reports about this tragic event have reached me here during my trip. It is shocking, appalling, and unreal. My experience from my visits to Israel, from my last visit when I attended the funeral of Prime Minister Rabin, simply tells me that this is an extremnely tragic and difficult situation.

I think it is necessary to look for new solutions. It has become clear that merely positive steps are not enough and that some more resolute steps need to be taken. I really wish Prime Minister Peres succeeds in finding them. [end recording]

Czech Republic: Klaus on FRY, Croatia Visits, Koruna

LD0503201896 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1715 GMT 5 Mar 96

["Regular interview" with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by special correspondent Martin Dorazin; in Belgrade, date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Dorazin] Prime Minister, this interview is being recorded in Belgrade, in the FRY. It is a country surrounded by a number of myths in connection with its role in the Balkans conflict. You have said several times that you reject a black and white vision of this situation. Could you specify?

[Klaus] I do not know if I can specify much. It has seemed to me in the past years—and I have tried to express it clearly—that the black and white vision consisting of a culprit and a victim, as has been interpreted in the world press, is very simplified. I have said it many times, and it seems to me that all of a sudden everybody has confessed to this fact, and I could have kept my previous view without any change. So, it seems to me that the situation in the former Yugoslavia has moved forward. It is evident in that the strength for further fighting and killing has, fortunately, somewhat evaporated. The world community has also adopted a more balanced attitude, and that has made it possible to find a certain way out. The Dayton agreements represent the first step, and now the second step should follow. I was surprised that President Milosevic put great stress on the significance of the elections, which will now take place in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He stressed the fact that there were politicians who had gained a mandate five or six years ago but today are out of touch with the thinking of the citizens of this country. I was interested in his optimism when he said that new politicians would come with a more realistic and pragmatic vision and that they would be strong enough to solve the situation favorably. If this is to be the second step, it will be very positive.

[Dorazin] You have indicated that your meeting President Slobodan Milosevic yesterday was the most interesting thing for us. Is he the same as he was before 1990?

[Klaus] I cannot assess this. I have not seen him at any other time, and I must say that what I have read about him and what I have experienced talking to him for one hour is harmonious for me. It seems to me that, if we look away from exaggerated assessments, he is a politician who trusts himself in many things, who has a certain charisma for his citizens. He is a politician who, thanks to his background in business and banking, has a certain inclination to see things pragmatically. But I do not profess to be an expert on the Serbian situation.

[Dorazin] We visited the FRY yesterday; today we are in Croatia. Could you describe the position of these two countries in our trade?

[Klaus] The share of these countries at the moment is indeed very small and does not correspond to what it used to be in the past. In the past, Czechoslovakia was in fourth place in trade with Yugoslavia, behind Germany, the USSR, and Italy. So it is evident that our task today is to bring it back somehow. I do not know if we can achieve fourth place, but, in any case, the volume of our mutual trade should grow. There is interest on our side in the power industry and the car industry. Our trams are in Belgrade, and there is interest in the purchase of more trams, so I think the chances are good. [passage omitted]

[Dorazin] One thing that has escaped attention somehow, perhaps due to the events of last week, is the widening of the exchange rate band of the koruna. It seems there will be no real impact for the ordinary citizen. Can you explain this?

[Klaus] [Passage omitted] This step is naturally aimed primarily against those speculating with the Czech koruna. The fixed exchange rate provided them in the past with a very good living, and they were getting rich on it.

I hope the stability of our economy will continue to be reflected in the stability of the exchange rate of the Czech koruna. However, this exchange rate will no longer be fixed totally. It will fluctuate from day to day within a certain band. [passage omitted]

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[Dorazin] Thank you for the interview.

Czech Republic: Klaus on Exchange Rate, Tax Decision

AU0503161196 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 1 Mar 96 p 3

[Interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Vit Drbal; place and date not given: "Relaxing the Exchange Rate Is a Necessary and Correct Step"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Drbal] Mr. Prime Minister, in your opinion, what kind of contribution will the 28 February decision by the Central Bank to expand the koruna's exchange-rate band from plus/minus 0.5 percent to plus/minus 7.5 percent make to our economy?

[Klaus] I think this is a step in the right direction. We have been aware of the necessity of this step for some time, and, in fact, the issue merely involved its correct timing. I think it is fitting that it was carried out now, on the one hand, in a situation of extraordinary balance and calm in our foreign currency markets and, on the other, in the economy as a whole. I believe this change in the exchange-rate range will not, in essence, cause any visible or significant change in the level of the koruna's exchange rate.

[Drbal] Do you think that expanding the koruna's exchange-rate band will influence the Czech Republic's balance of trade?

[Klaus] Not immediately. The balance of trade has determining elements other than the size of the koruna's fluctuation band. Exports and imports rose at roughly the same rate in January. This is a quite satisfactory economic result for me, although it is impossible to put too much emphasis on one month.

[Drbal] On Wednesday, the government supported the proposal to reduce the tax burden in the form, in essence, suggested by Finance Minister Ivan Kocarnik. Do you think the coalition will also support this proposal in parliament?

[Klaus] I have to admit that I really do not expect this. At the moment, I have a feeling that talks with the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party would be possible, but I do not envisage that the Civic Democratic Alliance would not favor its own proposal. It is evident that the tax amendment will have to be endorsed with the support of part of the opposition. But, which part, I do not know. [passage omitted]

Czech Republic: ODS's Necas Suspected of Corruption

AU0503160696 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 2 Mar 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Jaroslav Kmenta: "Holan Canceled the Tender at the Insistence of His Deputy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Petr Necas, first deputy defense minister and a representative of the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] in parliament, tried hard to cancel the Army tender, worth several billion, to provide a staff information system.

After the selection commission had declared the Unisys company the winner last fall, Necas intervened directly to cancel the tender by sending an official letter to Defense Minister Vilem Holan. According to Army sources, whose information is now being verified by the secret services, his endeavors were motivated by an attempt to accommodate as much as possible the E.D.S. company, which came in second in the tender.

Petr Necas, however, categorically rejects such a motivation. He and the E.D.S. company's director, Karel Visnak, who had submitted an objection to the outcome of the competition, deny that they would somehow have combined their efforts to cancel the tender. The authorities that otherwise cooperate closely with the police in investigating serious crimes, however, are now checking a report that the Civic Democratic Party was offered a sum of $1.0 million as a commission to work toward canceling the tender.

Moreover, an official from another Defense Ministry office has confirmed that they already know about the corruption attempt. "We have a letter that suggests, rather significantly, a suspicion of bribery," he declared.

Necas, who is the ODS's most highly placed representative in the defense department, sent an emphatic protest to Defense Minister Vilem Holan (Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL]) on 6 November 1995—that is, 10 days after the selection commission had completed its work—against the course of the selection procedure. The document is described as an "informative report for the defense minister."

Apart from the 11 points in which Necas criticizes the conditions for the tender, the report contains a suggestion to cancel the whole thing. "Unless the functionality of the system and its interoperability with NATO were to be guaranteed while maintaining the price, I personally would not abstain from a radical solution, including canceling the selection procedure and advertising a new one," said the first deputy in his report to his superior.

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A suspicion that Necas was trying to cancel the tender for reasons other than specialist ones was aroused among Army officials after the majority of his objections were rejected by the deputy defense minister for economic issues, Miroslav Kalousek (KDU-CSL).

He was asked by Holan for an expert point of view on Necas's objections. "I recommend that Dr. Necas's suggestions not be accepted," said Kalousek on 14 November in a letter to the minister.

Some of Petr Necas's fundamental criticisms concur with those that then appeared a few days later in the official objections submitted by the E.D.S. company.

Holan canceled the tender on 5 December. He has never explained the reasons that induced him to make this decision, and even today he does not want to comment on the situation. The Ministry for Economic Competition stated last week that, by canceling this competition, Holan had broken the law on assigning public tenders.

"Everything happened in a hurry, under pressure. The legal consequences of the cancellation were not discussed in much depth at the minister's special definitive consultative meeting," said a Defense Ministry official, who is afraid that he could lose his job if his name were published.

Necas has confirmed that he wrote the report on the information system tender; he denies, however, that he would have been motivated other than professionally. He claims that the tender is so strategic that a great deal of attention has to be paid to it.

The head of the E.D.S. company, Karel Visnak, has denied that his firm would use the strongest political party to promote its interests in the defense department. "This is nonsense. We are absolutely politically neutral," he declared.

"It is a political game with high stakes, and I can only have problems by accommodating you," said one of the selection commission's members a few days ago when he was asked to comment on the course of the tender.

There has been speculation since 1994—when the department was headed by Antonin Baudys—on the possible influence of the political parties on the course of Army tenders. The KDU-CSL, whose members hold the posts of minister and economic deputy minister, was accused by ODS Deputy Jan Kramek in January of obtaining money for its party coffers from Army tenders. Kramek, however, never backed up his claims with evidence, and, in essence, he withdrew them himself a few days later.

Experts who have been studying the arms trade for several years are, however, on Kramek's side. "He knew what he was saying. Harbor no illusions about these deals," said one of the experts on military tenders.

Czech Republic: Saab Makes Air Force 'Lucrative Offer'

AU0503151996 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 1 Mar 96 p 1

[Article by "(gag, km)": "The Air Force Is Inclining Toward Saab Fighters"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The most likely option to date for the modernization of the Air Force fighter, which had reckoned with the purchase of U.S. F-16 aircraft, is receding into the background. Namely, the Swedish Saab company has made the Army an unusually lucrative offer. A highly placed Army source has described its JAS-35 Gripen aircraft as state-of-the-art. The expert also sees an advantage of the possible contract in the fighter's acceptable price, which is one of the important selection criteria.

"The specialist and lay public will, in the end, be surprised by the General Staff's recommendation," said another expert yesterday. He wanted to remain anonymous because he would face a tough penalty for any kind of information leak about the Air Force's modernization.

The prestigious U.S. weekly DEFENSE NEWS also refers to the so far classified option for rearming the Czech Air Force. According to the weekly, the Swedes are offering Prague brand new Gripens for the same price as the older modernized F-16A aircraft offered by the Americans. "The northerners do not intend in the least to vacate the Central European market without a fight," claims DEFENSE NEWS. The fact that the Swedish fighter has a U.S. General Electric-Volvo engine manufactured under license increases its chances.

The Swedish option for modernizing the Air Force envisages purchasing seven Gripens in the years 1999-2000. Until then, however, the modernized MiG-21's would have to serve the Army. Pilots should manage the transition to state-of-the-art navigational and weapons electronics with the aid of the already modernized MiG's equipped with advanced avionics.

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Slovakia: Daily Criticizes Czech View of Primakov Visit

AU0503162296 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 2 Mar 96 p 1

[Commentary by Viera Urbanova from the "Public Matter" column]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is very important for Slovakia—also in view of its strategic location in Europe—to have clarified relations with Russia. The more so that Moscow has made crystal clear its negative stance toward NATO's plans to expand its sphere of influence to include the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. It is unnecessary to belittle Russia's concerns that the membership of the USSR's former satellites in the pact will worsen its geopolitical and military situation. Mind you, it is impossible to exclude Russia from a Pan-European security system and, if no satisfactory solution is found, stability in Europe may be impaired. Doubtlessly, this is understood on both sides—in the East and in the West.

Therefore, the much-discussed issue of the Slovak Republic's admission into the North Atlantic alliance, understandably, also came up during the visit of Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov. Primakov stated clearly that he did not come to Slovakia to dictate or give advice. The future orientation of our country is, according to him, our sovereign internal affair. The Slovak side has confirmed repeatedly its orientation toward the European structures and NATO. Despite this, certain circles are still trying to create the impression that the current ruling coalition would like to bring the Slovak Republic under Russia's influence and that the visit from the Kremlin proves this explicitly. The expedience or shortsightedness of these commentaries is unequivocally contingent on political interests. It is no surprise, therefore, that, alongside the sober assessments in the foreign press of the visit to Slovakia by the head of Russian diplomacy, the artificially created syndrome of Slovak orientation toward the East is again being dished up—in this context—in the right-wing LIDOVE NOVINY. Well, the Czech elections are looming.

In any case, the complicated relationship between NATO and Russia remains open. However, it will certainly not be resolved in Bratislava or Prague.

Slovakia: Coalition Party Leader Criticizes EU Demands

AU0503174196 Bratislava SME in Slovak 2 Mar 96 p 3

[Article by "sp": "Slovak National Party About the Expanding Camp of Euroskeptics"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"The amendment of the Penal Code (the so-called Law on the Protection of the Republic) is in conformity with our ideas, except for some minor comments," Slovak National Party [SNS] Deputy Chairwoman Anna Malikova said yesterday. Giving the social situation of citizens as a reason for joining the coalition is typical of the demagoguery of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] leaders. The SDL's anxiety over Slovakia's weak foreign policy standing is equally unfounded. The SNS has findings from the West suggesting that advanced Western democracies are anxious over where the neocommunists, who are in power in all East and Central European countries with the exception of the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, and Albania, are heading. SNS Deputy Chairman Jozef Sedovic said that "the EU's demands that the 10-percent import surcharge be abolished by 30 June, that the Jaslovske Bohunice nuclear power plant be closed, and that energy prices be liberalized in the Slovak Republic are at variance with the EU's proclaimed interest in raising the standard of the economy of the Slovak Republic. The fulfillment of the EU demands would halt economic growth." According to Sedovic, these strictly formulated demands are at odds with respect for the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic and will mean the expansion of the camp of Euroskeptics in Slovakia.

Slovakia: KDH on Coalition's New 'Privatization Method'

AU0503173296 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 1 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by "ns": "New Privatization Method—'Model 34'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—According to the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH], the present coalition has started implementing a totally new and "original" privatization method. The Christian Democrats introduced it to reporters yesterday under the working title "Model 34." The whole matter takes the following course: The hopeful candidate for the privatization of a certain company is visited by a member of the district "action five" [committees made up of representatives of coalition parties operating at district level], who tells him: "The firm will be yours

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but you will put 34 percent aside." When he asks "For whom?" he receives a simple reply: "Wait, you will see."

According to KDH's information, the government coalition is acquiring in this way direct capital participation in firms. In the event of firms of all-Slovak significance, responsibility for the acquisition of the aforementioned share is borne directly by someone from Tomasikova street—the HZDS head office, in the event of companies of district importance, by a member of the district action five.

The KDH also published information on the privatization of the Bratislava state enterprise Zeleznicne Stavitelstvo [Railroad Construction]. The company, worth 580 million korunas [Sk], was acquired in 1992 by a specific buyer, who then set up a limited liability company, together with three managing partners. After a while, however, the partners started selling this property at incredibly low prices, without the original buyer's knowledge, to a completely new limited liability company that they themselves set up under the name Zeleznicne Stavitelstvo Bratislava. As a result of this management, the property of the former state enterprise shrunk to Sk200 million and only 300 of the original 1,500 employees remain. The first limited liability company has filed for bankruptcy because it is unable to honor its financial commitments. According to KDH Deputy G. Palacka, the law was repeatedly violated in this case. The juicy aspect of the whole affair is that one of the managing partners and owners of the new limited liability company is Silvia Gasparovicova, wife of the National Council of the Slovak Republic chairman.

[Bratislava SME in Slovak on 1 March on page 1 carries a 400-word interview with KDH Deputy Chairman Mikulas Dzurinda by Alena Gottweisova entitled "KDH Wants To Subject Privatization to Scrutiny," in which Dzurinda explains the "substance of the 'Model 34' being currently implemented by the government coalition." Asked what the KDH intends to do about this, Dzurinda says: "We will attend to the establishment of commissions that will subject each privatization project to a thorough legal scrutiny. There will not be any velvet. We are not going to pass laws at night but we will pass them quickly. Based on these laws, we will derive personal responsibility. We are also considering ways of reprivatizing some unlawfully privatized firms. There cannot be any talk of nationalization, of course. However, it is impossible to justly manage unjustly acquired property and we will do everything we can to abide by this principle."]

Slovakia: Possibility of SDL Joining Coalition Examined

AU0503214996 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 28 Feb 96 p 2

[Article by Jan Smolec: "Peter Weiss in Meciar's Cabinet?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The circus presented to us recently by some SDL [Party of the Democratic Left] members, affected my neighbor to such a degree that he sarcastically asked me yesterday whether I was getting ready to write a column on Peter Weiss joining Meciar's cabinet. I replied by asking if he wishes to have such a politician in the government. He shook his head. Four decades of communist government, he said, is enough forever.

The fact is, however, that SDL politicians seriously reflect on the question of entering the government. They refer to it as a fait acompli. Their reasons bring about smiles. They intend to join Meciar's government only because the present coalition is in a deep crisis. The infallible SDL full of experts wants to pull the government out of trouble.

A political entity, which barely made it into the parliament and is disintegrating, wants to save the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] trusted by more than 30 percent of its citizens? Moreover, it dares to dictate conditions under which it is willing to join the coalition. It will not be possible without radical changes in the coalition and the HZDS policy. A political mannequin, who will no longer chair the party and does not even know who will succeed him, wants to dictate various conditions to the election victor and a well-working coalition.

We could dismiss his statements with a wave of the hand. Information was leaked, however, from the SDL circles that specific projects and processes have been drafted for this purpose. It is nothing new under the sun. The objective is obvious. The HZDS must be disintegrated.

Perhaps under the influence of reminiscences of Victorious February [communist coup in 1948], the heirs and successors to the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia suddenly began to long for power. According to one scenario, SDL ministers should appear in Meciar's government as soon as April of this year. Is it that the authors of this scenario were influenced by Lenin's April Theses?

SDL emissaries have already contacted several ministers, state secretaries, and HZDS and ZRS deputies. They failed. The independent political observers are

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taken aback by the fact that while the Christian Democratic Movement is attacking the HZDS from the outside with open threats ("we are going to lock you up!"), the SDL wants to repeat the destruction model of 1993 and disintegrate the HZDS from within.

Yesterday, even the prime minister commented on the issue of this entity joining the government coalition.

"It is not realistic that the SDL would join the government. After all, the present coalition works without any problems. After tedious labor, the first seeds of success are germinating. The coalition treaties are valid. The unofficial talks on the part of the SDL are more indicative of attempts to break the coalition. Whoever wants to talk must announce his coming and politely ring the doorbell. Only the political board is authorized to talk and conduct dialogues with the SDL representatives."

The government continued its work without any disturbance yesterday. During the recess, ministers of both the Association of Workers of Slovakia and the Slovak National Party sincerely and smilingly congratulated and kissed Olga Keltosova on the occasion of her birthday.

I really cannot imagine Peter Weiss and the members of his entourage in this government. The mean trick he played on Meciar in March 1994 immediately comes to my mind. Even my independent neighbor figured out the intentions of the SDL. They are attracted more by privatization than by the government.

Slovakia: Coexistence Fears Effects of Administration Reform

LD0503185896 Bratislava Slovak Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 5 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Political representatives of the Hungarian community of Slovakia fear that the public administration reform under preparation will adversely affect not only the Hungarian minority but Slovak democracy in general.

It was said at a press briefing held by Coexistence Political Movement today that the Hungarian coalition will be ready to turn to international forums if the Slovak Parliament approves the government's proposal. Coexistence Chairman Miklos Duray said that the public administration's division is every country's domestic affair. In this case in Slovakia, however, this matter is about the oppression of democracy and the rights of the Hungarian minority living in Slovakia.

According to the Coexistence chairman, the government's plan is going to change the ethnic composition of the districts, therefore the Hungarians of Slovakia will not have an opportunity to have a say in the life of their villages, towns, and regions to the same extent as before.

It was also said at the briefing that the bill on the new regional and administrative division of the country is likely to be followed by an amendment to the electoral law, a step which would reduce the chances of minority politicians to be elected to parliament. Duray did not rule out the possibility of early parliamentary elections either.

The Coexistence politicians hope that they will be able to hold a discussion about all these problems during their talks with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar on 7 March.

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Hungary: Tabajdi on Relations With Ethnic Hungarians

AU0503171796 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 4 Mar 96 p 2

[Interview with Csaba Tabajdi, political state secretary at the Prime Minister's Office, by Zoltan Udvardy; place and date not given: "It Is Hard To Show Spectacular Results"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Udvardy] Postponing the day of debate on the autonomy concept of ethnic Hungarians beyond our borders stirred strong arguments recently. Are there contested issues in this area?

[Tabajdi] The Hungarian Government clearly supports the efforts of the ethnic Hungarians living beyond our borders. At the same time, however, a day for debate in Parliament is not the best form of discussing these efforts. Nor is it timely, because several organizations of ethic Hungarians beyond our borders—like the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ-UDMR] or the Hungarian Coalition—want to further specify their autonomy concepts. A parliamentary debate would only influence this; moreover, it would represent an interference in the internal debates of the ethnic Hungarians abroad. In my view, discussing the autonomy concept of the ethnic Hungarians in closed professional and political workshops would be the correct and desirable form.

[Udvardy] In his public letter, Andras Agoston, chairman of the Democratic Union of Vojvodina Hungarians [VMDK], argues that you do not support the minority autonomy concepts sufficiently.

[Tabajdi] Andras Agoston's view that the Hungarian Government does not support the autonomy concepts is unfounded. He should really know about the professional and diplomatic aid Hungary provided in publicizing the VMDK autonomy concept. [passage omitted]

[Udvardy] [Transylvanian Presbyterian Bishop] Laszlo Tokes recently suggested that the Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation documents be supplemented with the minorities' official position. Laszlo Tokes also made unpleasant statements about the Hungarian Government, but he spoke about you with appreciation. What is your opinion about the minorities' criticism directed at the Hungarian Government?

[Tabajdi] Bela Marko personally refuted Laszlo Tokes's allegation that we interfere in the internal affairs of the RMDSZ. We are in steady contact with Laszlo Tokes, as the honorary chairman of the RMDSZ. I find it slightly strange that Laszlo Tokes also criticizes the government on issues like the South Tirol model, a model that I was the first to repeatedly present in parliamentary debates. The Hungarian foreign minister recently confirmed that, in his view, the South Tirol model represented a solution for the relevant minorities. [passage omitted]

[Udvardy] To what extent did we succeed in making the Western European community aware of the problems of the ethnic Hungarian minority?

[Tabajdi] It is an important task to work out a system of arguments with which we can affect the Western European partners and organizations that are not very sensitive to this issue. The minority issue and the problems of ethnic Hungarians should be tackled in a more determined way in conformity with Europe, because this is also an integration interest, namely to make sure that Hungary will not face impossible conditions in the course of integration. [passage omitted]

Hungary: Tendencies Against Spirit of Treaty in Slovakia

LD0503181496 Bratislava Slovak Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 5 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian Foreign Ministry, for the time being, has not taken an official stand on the public administration reform under preparation in Slovakia, but closely follows concrete steps taken in connection with this, Gabor Szentivanyi [Hungarian foreign affairs spokesman] said at the ministry's press briefing today.

According to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry's state secretary, there have been in Slovakia tendencies which are not in accord with the spirit of the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty. In connection with this, the state secretary mentioned the approval of the Law on the Slovak State Language, the delaying of the debate on the use of minority languages, and the bill on the regional division of the country's public administration.

Hungary: Expert Talks Held With Romania on Principles

AU0503165296 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 5 Mar 96 p 9

[Article by Ferenc Garzo: "We Are Still Arguing About Principles With the Romanians"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungarian and Romanian experts have launched the process, but the issue is still at its beginning: Last week, talks were held on two of the four documents that are treated as a unified package. Independent of each other, two delegations at two separate places held discussions on the mechanism of conciliation and partnership, and on the code of conduct to be drawn up on the national minority issue.

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We interviewed Andras Gyenge, who participated in the talks as ministerial commissioner for national minority issues, on the latter issue. He said that only the principles were discussed, the two sides have different attitudes on certain points. This was only a discussion of principles to gain information, after the sides had exchanged their proposals in writing, Gyenge said. He added that this was the first time the two countries' experts came together and, putting the papers on the table, they informed each other of their views. At the moment, four documents are being discussed and, according to the Hungarians, they are all interconnected. At least three of them, namely the basic treaty, the cooperation agreement, and the national minority code of conduct, are legal type documents.

At the moment, the main question is what elements the code of conduct should include and whose conduct it should be about. The Hungarian side believes that the given state has to guarantee the rights that are internationally accepted for national minorities, and it has to ensure that the norm systems laid down in them are adhered to, in other words, it has to create a situation in the country's domestic legal system which allows the national minority members to use these rights. On the other hand, the Romanian side tends to emphasize that one state should receive guarantees from the other state that it would not abuse the national minority issue.

Gyenge said that in this phase of the series of talks, experts of the two countries examined which main documents of the United Nations, the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], and the Council of Europe contain the aforementioned norm system.

Naturally, they got to the Council of Europe's already much debated Recommendation No. 1201 and established that, in connection with this, the views are still different. The two sides also have different views on the OSCE's Geneva document.

At the same time, Gyenge found it an interesting development that the sides agreed on mentioning the Council of Europe's self-government charter although this has not been ratified by the Romanian side. The Hungarians were told that this ratification would soon take place. A similar agreement was reached on the issue of the Language Charter, another document of the Council of Europe.

Gyenge emphasized that a difference of attitude exists between the two sides on certain issues. For example, according to Budapest, the point is not that the abuse of the national minority issue should be eliminated because this is not the basis of conciliation between the two countries.

The Hungarian side suggested that they should not only conduct talks on a theoretical level, concrete texting should be started in the coming rounds. For this, it is necessary to write new drafts which take the results of these talks into consideration.

Much depends also on the results of the Budapest round of talks to be started on 11 March, at which the other two documents, namely the basic treaty and the issue of the political statement will also be discussed.

Hungary: Horn Announces Steps Against Black Economy

LD0603130496 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 6 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] According to researchers, the black economy makes up 30 percent of GNP. Almost one quarter of families' expenditure is being spent in this sphere, and it is estimated that this costs 100 billion forints in lost tax revenue. According to a government assessment prepared last week, the growth of the black economy has slowed down in Hungary, but further effective measures should be taken to clamp down on it.

At the initiative of the independent deputy, Peter Zwack, the National Assembly is currently holding a political debate on this issue. Our parliamentary correspondents, Andras Kerekes and Tamas Luigits, report:

[Kerekes] The government is determined to take every possible legal step to clamp down on the black economy, but the emphasis is on the legal nature of this fight, Justice Minister Pal Vastagh said in his opening address. [passage omitted]

[Kerekes] Soon before this news bulletin, Prime Minister Gyula Horn also asked for leave to speak and said that although the fight against the black economy is not exclusively a government task, the government has a great responsibility and does not want to evade it. He envisaged organizational measures, among other things.

[Begin Horn recording] The present Government Supervisory Bureau [Kormanyzati Ellenoerzoe Iroda] will become the Government Supervisory and Investigation Bureau [Kormanyzati Ellenoerzoe es Nyomozati Iroda], and in addition will be given policing authority [rendvedelmi jogositvanyok].

Also, we will set up a Central Economic Investigation Office [Koezponti Gazadasagi Nyomozo Hivatal], which will operate as an independent organization—naturally, in cooperation with the prosecutors' office, the Customs and Excise Office, the Tax and Financial Inspection Office [APEH], and the police—and will be

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directly subordinated to the prime minister's office. [end recording]

[Kerekes] The office will start operating in this half of 1996, Gyula Horn said.

The debate continues.

Hungary: MSZP Regains Lead in Popularity Poll

AU0403174096 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 4 Mar 96 pp 1, 5

[Unattributed report: "Socialists Again in the Lead—The Szonda Ipsos's Latest Party Popularity List"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Independent Smallholders Party [FKGP] had led the parties' popularity list for a quarter of a year but the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] regained the first place in February—this can be seen as the most interesting result of the Szonda Ipsos company's latest national political opinion poll.

From January to February, the MSZP's supporter camp increased by 3 percent and the FKGP's decreased by 1 percent—as a result, they swapped places and the MSZP is now in the lead. Neither these changes nor the changes in the number of the other parties' voters—the KDNP [Christian Democratic People's Party] gained one point and the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] lost one—can be said to be statistically significant. The MSZP's advantage is greater if we take the politically active population as a basis: It would reach 30 percent among those who are certain to participate in the elections and have a party preference, and the FKGP would get 24 percent. The MSZP has made some gain in all strata of society apart from young people. People living in Budapest, those with higher education, in leading positions, and those over the age of 50 tend to form the MSZP's voting base.

Preparations for the Hungarian Democratic Forum's congress and debates on the party's future direction and leadership were conducted in February. In connection with this, it is worth reviewing the way opinions on this party have changed since the 1994 parliamentary elections. It could usually be found in the fourth or fifth place of the popularity list; its support never went as low as to endanger its parliamentary participation at "elections to be held this Sunday." It could expect 8 to 11 percent support among the active section of the adult population who chose a party. About the direction of the changes, it can be said that its supporter base had increased a little until autumn 1995 and then the proportion of its supporters somewhat decreased. The proportion of those antagonistic to the party has changed much more. In the summer of 1994, some 17 percent of the population saw the MDF as the most unwanted party. Since then, the proportion of those with negative feelings toward it has continuously decreased and amounts to 6 percent at the moment. The composition of the MDF's supporters has also changed a lot. At the elections, we found increasing number of supporters as we went higher in the age groups, but this characteristic does not exist anymore. At the moment, no typical age group exists, which also indicates that the party's voting base has become younger than before. In the meantime, the importance of the middle classes has increased among the MDF's supporters, and of those in lower and higher status has decreased. Nevertheless, the party's core consists of people with higher education and those in leading positions. It is another interesting fact that the MDF has become stronger in Budapest and weaker in the provinces since the elections. By now, in the second choice of the MDF voters, the Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party [FIDESZ-MPP] has joined—and in fact overtaken—the Christian Democratic People's Party: 19 percent of these voters see the KDNP as a second choice and 22 percent see the FIDESZ this way. The situation is much clearer regarding the dislikes because these are mostly expressed against the MSZP (47 percent). The MDF's voters have a special and contradictory relationship with the FKGP: The same number consider it to be the second most attractive party (16 percent) as those who dislike it (15 percent).

Which party would you vote for if elections were held now?

Party	Percent of People Questioned	Percent of Those Questioned Committed to a Party
MSZP	16	26
SZDSZ*	8	13
MDF	5	7
FKGP	15	24
KDNP	6	10
FIDESZ	8	12
Workers Party	2	3
Entrepeneurs Party	1	2
Other parties	2	3
Unsure or would not vote	37	0

Footnote: * SZDSZ: Alliance of Free Democrats

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MDF Supporters and Those Who Dislike the MDF Since the Parliamentary Elections

	Sympathizers (Would Vote for the MDF)	Those Against (Would by No Means Vote for the MDF)
	Percent of All People of Voting Age	
Third-Quarter 1994	6	17
Fourth-Quarter 1994	6	13
First-Quarter 1995	5	10
Second-Quarter 1995	6	9
Third-Quarter 1995	7	7
Fourth-Quarter 1995	5	6
Jan-Feb 1996	5	6

Hungary: Editorial Views Consequences of MDF Split

AU0503172296 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 5 Mar 96 p 3

[Unattributed editorial: "Plus-Minus One Party"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] has split into two after two years of being in the opposition. Two new parties have emerged from the ruins and, even if the party led by Sandor Lezsak preserves the old name, this story cannot continue. There might be new achievements, but we see little chances for this. Formally, nothing is threatening government stability, but Hungarian parliamentarism is in trouble.

This split was brought by the natural self-movement of the party structures in Eastern Europe. The MDF leadership failed because they were unable to develop into a convincing opposition alternative, they could not stand the frigidity of being out of power, and they were not competitive in the race of right-wing rhetoric. Now Szabo and his followers are trying to organize a Christian-democratic, national-liberal, Antall-type party from those who left the MDF, while the rest of the MDF is left with reviving the national and populist line, namely the turn to the right. They can again try some kind of a third way and mix some East European authoritarianism and anti-Western feeling into it.

The six-party legislature did not last this time either: the parties that emerged with the change in the regime are now undergoing the division known from the previous legislative cycle. Parliamentarism is in crisis because the various factions of diminishing strength and the dividing parties do not show any credible alternative. Parliamentarism also weakens when the parties fighting for the inheritance are busy with each other and with themselves and do not care about the affairs of the population.

The consequence of the split is that, from now on, [Smallholders' Party Chairman] Jozsef Torgyan will lead the largest opposition group in Parliament. Committee places and parliamentary functions will have to be redistributed. The MDF crisis will also affect the other opposition parties: the radicals might grow in strength in the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP], and the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] can now face a long period of loneliness. It is not accidental that the FIDESZ did not accept their political friends who became homeless: [FIDESZ Chairman] Viktor Orban would like a center-right policy not burdened by any kind of governing past.

The Hungarian Democratic People's Party starts with empty funds, but it does not carry the hundreds of millions of MDF debts. It is difficult to establish party organizations today, particularly for a leader who already named his own party's membership "terrible" once. (This was later corrected to terribly enthusiastic.) Candidates for membership are not knocking at the door of any political party in Hungary today.

The prevailing situation increases the responsibility of the socialists and the free democrats considerably. It is a mistake to think that the opposition has "shot itself out." It is a mistake to think that the leading party can again be its own opposition. The Hungarian society no longer believes in omniscient parties. It is dangerous to choose the ignorant.

Hungary: Changes in Opposition Forces Evaluated

AU0503164696 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 5 Mar 96 p 3

[Interview with political scientist Istvan Stumpf by Balazs Stepan; place and date not given: "The Opposition Is Getting Clearer"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Stepan] The Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] has split. Ivan Szabo announced the establishment of the Hungarian Democratic People's Party [MDNP] on 4 March. In your view, will this help to speed up the formation of blocs and alliance systems in the opposition?

[Stumpf] In my view, the opposition is starting to become purified. The chance of setting up a civic

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alliance now increases because Szabo has very good relations with the Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party [FIDESZ-MPP]. The other side is in a more pliable state, the question is where the right edge will be formed. Cooperation might be formed between [Independent Smallholders Party Chairman] Torgyan and the two other party chairmen but even the possibility of being suitable for government cannot emerge in this kind of setup. The other possibility is that the MDF and the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] try to take away Torgyan's voters but we will only be able to see this clearly after the KDNP's national committee session in April.

[Stepan] Has Szabo got a chance to set up a stable and functioning party? Up to now, all we have found out is that the number of deputies leaving the MDF is enough to form a parliamentary group but we do not know what proportion of the membership will follow them.

[Stumpf] Based on the choice of its name, the membership may agree to join it. One must not forget that 60 percent of the delegates supported [MDF Chairman] Lezsak and 40 percent Szabo. This says a lot about the division of the membership.

[Stepan] But the party's infrastructure is with the MDF, and this way it is rather difficult to set up a mass base for a new party....

[Stumpf] As far as I know, the MDF's local organizations are independent legal entities. Those who leave also take the parliamentary group's money with them, at the same time, Szabo's step was not taken at a bad time because the fate of party property is under discussion now and those leaving can also have a say in it.

[Stepan] Which electoral strata can the MDNP win over to itself?

[Stumpf] At the moment, the MDF's popularity is at rock bottom. According to the latest surveys, some 5 percent of the electors support it. So the MDF's popularity would have increased anyway, but the new party has created an alternative situation and the MDNP founders' room for maneuver has increased. Very much depends now on the FIDESZ, it will have an important role; it is to be seen to what extent it will be able to become a catalyst for opposition cooperation, because the issue of opposition alliance is of key importance. As a matter of fact, Szabo, just as the KDNP and the FIDESZ, place their hopes in the undecided voters, the provincial intelligentsia, and the disillusioned middle-class members. There is definitely no danger of Szabo turning toward the populist right wing.

[Stepan] At the same time, the emergence of the new party forces Lezsak toward the right....

[Stumpf] This can be dangerous for the FKGP [Independent Smallholders Party]. It is by no chance that Torgyan is now saying that Lezsak should admit that the Antall and Boross governments made mistakes, he should admit to the sins of the two previous governments....

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B-H: Bildt Claims 'Ethnic Cleansing' Continuing

AU0503144096 Vienna DER STANDARD in German 5 Mar 96 p 2

[Unattributed report: "'Ethnic Cleansing' Continues"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vienna—The "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia-Herzegovina continues, Carl Bildt, the coordinator for the country's reconstruction, said on the sidelines of the roundtable talks on human rights in Bosnia in Vienna on 4 March, referring to the exodus of Serbs from Sarajevo. The policy of ethnic cleansing also continues in the territories controlled by the Muslims and Croats, Bildt said at a joint press conference with Austrian Foreign Minister Wolfgang Schuessel.

Bildt announced that a center for coordinating human rights will be established in Sarajevo and he demanded more funds for the reconstruction of Bosnia. In contrast to the IFOR [Implementation Force] peace troops, the institutions in charge of human rights and reconstruction do not have the money for efficient work.

Schuessel said that a "sensible implementation of human rights" is the key to mutual understanding between the ethnic groups in Bosnia. He said that Gret Haller, whom the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] has appointed as ombudswoman for human rights, will be playing a central role in this.

Bosnian Foreign Minister Jadranko Prlic said that human rights cannot be enforced in Bosnia-Herzegovina without a reconstruction of the economy.

After meeting with Rajko Kasagic, the head of government of the "Serb Republic" (Republika Srpska) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Foreign Minister Schuessel announced that Austria is to establish contacts with the Serb Republic. According to the Dayton agreement, the Serb Republic is an "entity," he said. But he, Schuessel, "makes a distinction" between Kasagic and the "president" of the Serb Republic, Radovan Karadzic, he said.

B-H: Visit to Iran 'More Than Just a Good Move'

AU0603140696 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 6 Mar 96 p 2

[Commentary by Fuad Cibukcic: "Friendly Persuasion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The visit by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government delegation headed by Prime Minister Muratovic was like "a jab in the eye of the West." The hair on the heads of senior U.S. State Department officials stood on end at the sight of the picture of Muratovic's cordial meeting with Iranian President Rafsanjani.

We should not get flustered over this minor Washington headache because they only have themselves to blame. This visit is more than just a good move by the Bosnian politicians. We have waited long enough for the West to loosen its purse strings, and the little that they did give us we paid for with painful political decisions, or better said, by yielding to pressure. The Americans and Europeans have become accustomed to politely wringing our hand under the table, while smiling for the cameras. "If you do not back off a little in Mostar, the entire process will come to a standstill (whose fault is it?), we will reconsider the training of the Bosnian soldiers and their arming, and it will be harder to find money for the reconstruction." This, roughly, is what "the friendly" persuasion looked like. The military strategists in the Pentagon are losing sleep at the thought of the Iranians, the officers from Saudi Arabia, or some other Islamic country doing their share of training in Bosnia. In the talks currently under way in the United States on the announced formation of the federal army between Shalikashvili, that is, his subordinates, and Generals Delic and Budimir, this American "wish" was definitely "subtly" conveyed to them.

Such rapprochement by Bosnia does not suit our neighbors, Croatia, either. Namely, Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak, as the NEW YORK TIMES claims and Deutsche Welle correspondent Vjekoslav Krsnik reports, said: "If the Bosnian Government does not reduce the contacts with Iran and other radical Islamic countries, the fragile federation between the Croats and the Muslims could fall apart." This could also be interpreted as a threat. Croatia is not pleased with the situation slipping out of control, because it liked the situation before better, when carefully measured quantities of arms arrived in Bosnia through its hands. As of June when the arms embargo will be lifted, Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia could boost the high combat strength of the Bosnian Army. The ideal solution would be to maintain good relations with the West and the Middle East, because, although American, the dollars in a Bosniak pocket rustle equally pleasingly even if they come from Iran.

B-H: Presidency Discusses Sarajevo Transfer of Authority

AU0503195596 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 5 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] We have just received a report saying that the 312th session of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was held today. Presidency member Ejup Ganic presided over the session.

The presidency discussed the security situation in the Sarajevo districts which are to belong to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in accordance with the Dayton

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agreement. Avdo Hebib, interior minister of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, presented a report on the process and dynamics of the transfer of authority in these districts of our capital city. Minister Hebib informed the presidency that the police force's ethnic structure reflects the 1991 census of these areas.

The question of the destruction of housing and other facilities that is taking place before the federation police takes over was specifically raised, as was the signing of illegal sale and purchase contracts to sell property and facilities in these areas for next to nothing. Transactions of this kind are not legally valid.

The presidency expressed its satisfaction with the course of the Sarajevo districts' reintegration, and lauded the moral and professional approach of the police and all those who have participated in this delicate task of normalizing life in the Sarajevo districts. The presidency also discussed other issues within its authority.

B-H: Ganic Agrees Serb Settlement of Brcko Unacceptable

AU0503200196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 5 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Ejup Ganic, member of the Presidency of the Republic and vice president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Republic and Federation Prime Ministers Hasan Muratovic and Izudin Kapetanovic today received the Brcko municipality delegation led by Mayor Munib Jusufovic. The meeting was attended by Tuzla-Podrinje Canton Governor Izet Hadzic.

They discussed the newly created situation in Brcko, generated by the settlement of Serbs who have been forced out of the parts of Sarajevo to be transferred to the federation under pressure from Pale. They also discussed the program and preparations for the arbitration for the town of Brcko. It was unanimously decided that a forced and newly composed ethnic factual situation on the ground created by the current settlement of Serbs in Brcko would not be accepted.

This is yet another Serb deception forced upon them by the authorities from Pale, since they will have to move again from other people's property in accordance with the Dayton agreement.

Full support was also given to the activities and preparations for the arbitration, says the statement from Ganic's office.

B-H: Army Commander Delic Interviewed on U.S. Visit

LD0503223996 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 5 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A delegation of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croat Defense Council, led by Generals Rasim Delic and Zivko Budimir, paid a visit to the United States last week. Their visit was prompted by the obligation assumed by the U.S. Administration to arm the future army of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Dalida Jugo] Gen. Delic, you and Gen. Budimir paid a visit to the United States at the invitation of the U.S. Government. What was the objective of your visit?

[Delic] I can say that my seven-day visit to the United States was very seriously prepared by the U.S. side. We were received by leading figures from the U.S. Army, the Defense Department, and the State Department. I would like to say here, for instance, that we had talks with General Shalikashvili, Deputy Defense Secretary White, Clinton's security adviser Anthony Lake, and a number of senators and congressmen. We also toured three U.S. Army bases—Fort Polk, Fort Benning, and Fort Leavenworth—where U.S. Army units and officers are trained. There we were able to see the modern approach to training and education of units, officers, and command personnel.

In conclusion, we had a meeting with U.S. companies which offered aid in training and supplying the army of the Federation. On the basis of presentations given by the companies, we would have to choose one of them in the next few days; then the federal bodies of Bosnia-Herzegovina would conclude an agreement with it on supplying and arming the federal army. In fact, we want to do it in an organized manner; we want to deal with companies which have already done the same in a number of other countries, those which also offer professional help to the U.S. Army.

[Jugo] You said that the United States is prepared to give assistance to the federal army. Were there any specific agreements?

[Delic] Yes, usually we soldiers always talk in specific terms. I can say that on their participation the Pentagon, or rather the U.S. Government, has already given us such details. I have received a list of specific funds which the army of the Federation will receive in the period after D plus 90 to D plus 180. We are talking about a sum of several tens of millions of dollars. It would certainly be correct to wait until this is announced by the United States, which is hoping in this way to

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encourage other donors to make their contribution to equipping the Federation army. It was agreed that a donors' conference should be held in Ankara, which was originally planned for 15 March. Whether it will take place then remains to be seen.

All in all, I believe that there is readiness on the part of the United States, speaking specifically, to assist not only in equipping the Federation army, but also in creating [kreiranje] it—what it will be like, how it will be trained—because this will ensure above all that the United States will no longer have a need to intervene in this region, and the United States, by undertaking this commitment, is fulfilling a part of its own political plan with regard to its presence in the Islamic world and its status in the international community as a leading power. [end recording]

B-H: Gen Delic on Cooperation With U.S. Armed Forces

AU0503131896 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (Europe edition) in Serbo-Croatian 5 Mar 96 p 3

[Report by ONASA: "Changes in the Army Structure"]

[FBIS Translated Text] General Rasim Delic, commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army General Staff, who, together with Major Gen. Zivko Budimir, commander of the Croatian Defense Council General Staff, is currently in the United States where they are negotiating the future cooperation of Bosnia-Herzegovina armed forces with the U.S. Army, has said that the goal of future projects is the training of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation's armed forces for the maintenance of peace in Bosnia.

"We have been very seriously received here, in talks and tours of the U.S. Army training centers, and we have seen that the possibilities for helping us are indeed great, and that the realization of projects can soon start," Gen. Delic told ONASA's Washington correspondent.

According to Gen. Budimir, there was occasion to research the capabilities of modern military equipment, and to see what sort of restructuring needs to be implemented in the Bosnia-Herzegovina armed forces.

"We will need to change the structure of the army in order to maximally utilize the new equipment," Gen. Budimir said.

In answer to when the realization of projects will begin, and what type of arms can be expected, Gen. Delic said that this is, to a certain extent, dictated by the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace agreement.

"Beginning with the 90th day since the signing of the peace agreement in Paris, therefore, as of 15 March of this year, the embargo on light arms will be lifted and this will be the content of the initial consignments. The delivery of heavy arms, which we desperately lack, can only begin three months into the agreement, that is, 160 days after the signing of the agreement. The skies over Bosnia are particularly important to us. With this project we wish to defend ourselves from air attacks, and for this we need various antiaircraft systems, aircraft, and helicopters," Gen. Delic said.

B-H: Diplomats Say NATO To Expand IFOR Mandate

AU0503150496 Paris AFP in English 1438 GMT 5 Mar 96

[Article by Adrian Brown]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, March 5 (AFP)—Diplomats said Tuesday [5 March] NATO ambassadors have all but agreed to expand the mandate of the peace Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia to include helping in war crime investigations and preparing for elections.

Speaking in Brussels, diplomats said the new broader mandate, which NATO ambassadors discussed on Monday, should enable the 60,000 IFOR troops to leave Bosnia as planned within a year.

The change is still awaiting approval from Washington but diplomats said that US approval was certain to be given.

Meanwhile an EU diplomat in Bosnia said the European Union will extend its mandate in the divided southern town of Mostar from July until the end of 1996.

The EU has administered Mostar, a once beautiful and tourist-filled town shattered by 11 months of Moslem-Croat fighting in 1993 and early 1994, since July 1994.

The news of a planned change to the IFOR role in Bosnia came after a meeting of the NATO Council in Brussels Monday.

IFOR, which took over from the UN Protection Force in Bosnia in December, has so far concentrated on securing a separation zone between the former warring parties and overseeing demilitarization.

But while the military situation has been described as stable, criticism has grown of slow progress on the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Bosnian peace agreement.

"IFOR motto is going to be 'help but don't replace' the civil organisations taking part in the peace process," one NATO official said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

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"We have to get the civilian side moving fast for peace to be taken seriously, to create a climate of confidence so that the elections scheduled in September go off alright," a diplomat added.

"If the civilian effort does not start now, IFOR would have difficulty pulling out looking like a success," he said.

In Sarajevo, one of the gravest problems currently facing IFOR is posed by the exodus of thousands of Serbs ahead of the transfer of five city districts to mainly-Moslem authorities.

The suburb of Hadzici will transfer to government control Wednesday—after two earlier districts to transfer and ahead of the transfer of two more.

Responding to the plight of Moslem and Croat refugees seeking to return to homes in those districts from which they were forced to flee at the start of the Bosnian conflict, the UN refugee agency in Sarajevo said it was starting a programme financing repairs to their former homes.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees will begin this week a $2.5 million project to replace plumbing, windows and doors stripped from hundreds of apartments by departing Serbs, UNHCR spokesman Kris Janowski said.

The hardline Bosnian Serb leadership in Pale has been accused of deliberately provoking the flight of Serbs from Sarajevo by playing on fears that the mainly Moslem authorities would engage in reprisals for the brutal three-and-a-half year siege of the city.

In Pale, east of Sarajevo, Serb leaders said they would requisition what they refered to as "empty" buildings in Serb-held areas to house the Serbs who have left their homes around Sarajevo, the Serbs' SRNA news agency said.

In Tuzla, northern Bosnia, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) said it has set up a working group to investigate the fate of persons missing in Bosnia, including thousands from the former enclave of Srebrenica.

B-H: IFOR Spokesman 'Not Aware' of Expanded Mandate

AU0503154096 Paris AFP in English 1527 GMT 5 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, March 5 (AFP)—In Sarajevo, IFOR [Implementation Force] gave a cautious response to the news Tuesday [5 March] that its mandate may be expanded.

IFOR spokesman Captain Mark van Dyke said that, to his knowledge, IFOR commanders had not received new political or operational instructions.

"I am aware that General (George) Joulwan (NATO's supreme commander in Europe) has gone forward...requesting assistance to enable IFOR to continue to support the missions of civilan agencies under the Dayton agreement, to help them, to the best of our ability, with their missions," he said.

But, he said, he was not aware of new instructions to IFOR.

"Our mission continues. We do everything we can within our resources and our mandate to support the civilian mission and we will continue to do that," van Dyke said.

B-H: Zubak Meets EU Envoy, Discusses Mostar

LD0503193096 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 5 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, received Ambassador Garcia Vargas, EU special envoy; and Alfredo Matacotta, Italian Foreign Ministry coordinator for Mostar. Zubak said they discussed the implementation of the Rome agreement. We all agreed the Rome agreement is being implemented well and the Croatian side is very cooperative, Zubak said. He added that they discussed aspects of the EU mandate in Mostar after the elections in the town scheduled for May this year. The guests stressed Mostar's importance for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation project, President Zubak said. He stressed that the federal partner, the Muslim side, ignored the earlier agreement—that Sarajevo's organization should be achieved by a separate agreement. Zubak noted that the situation had not improved in Bugojno either, where refugees were still not returning and a new government was still not set up.

B-H: SDA Urges Immediate Settlement of Mostar Problems

AU0503131596 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (Europe edition) in Serbo-Croatian 5 Mar 96 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Protect the Rights of Bosniaks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The meeting of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] Executive Council, held in Sarajevo today [date not specified], focused on the current issues regarding the republic and federation in connection with the implementation of the Dayton and Rome agreements.

The Executive Council assessed as successful the heretofore activities of the federal bodies regarding the

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inclusion of Sarajevo municipalities in the federation, which has definitely lifted the blockade of Bosnia-Herzegovina's capital.

The Executive Council furthermore supported efforts on the setting up of the Sarajevo canton, and appealed to all responsible individuals to complete the setting up of the Central Bosnian and Neretva cantons, and initiate the setting up of the Gorazde canton. There are no obstacles to setting up these cantons.

The Executive Council has asked the federal authorities to immediately and comprehensively implement the agreement on Mostar, and to urgently form a single Mostar city administration pursuant to the Memorandum on Understanding and the Federal Constitution.

The information about the obstruction of the Rome agreement in Mostar's central zone was received with concern, as was the news that there are plans for the construction of a church at the site of the mosque in Pocitelj.

The Executive Council will ask state authorities, the Islamic community, and other institutions to honor their obligations regarding the protection of basic religious rights of the Bosniak people in Herzegovina.

The council also reviewed SDA activities and preparations for the forthcoming elections.

Members of the SDA Executive Council received with satisfaction the information issued by the medical team on the consistent improvement of President Alija Izetbegovic's health, reads the statement released by the SDA Executive Council

B-H: Opposition to Croat Construction in Central Mostar

AU0503204196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 5 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The mixed police patrols this morning removed taxi drivers from both parts of Mostar, who had been stationed in front of the former Hit department store in the central city zone.

The explanation for this, as given by the WEU [Western European Union] police commissioner in Mostar, is that the central zone is a part of the city that cannot be considered as belonging to either the east or the west side of Mostar.

Mirsad Behram reports from the Herzegovina city on this and other current issues:

[Begin recording] The explanation goes on to say that the taxi drivers, who used to be stationed at that location even before the war, would now have to submit a formal request to the WEU police commissioner. This decision by Commissioner Peter (?Lambrecht), as far as special authority in the central city district is concerned, would not be that strange if it were also to apply to the builders of the Croat National Theater and the Catholic church in the central district, who do not have the agreement of the Bosniak side or the European Administration. Administrator Koschnick himself at a recent news conference said that he had nothing against any kind of construction in the central city district if it was in accordance with the zoning plans from before the war. However, according to our information, the land on which the Croatian National Theater is being built—in the place of the former Hit department store—belongs to the Mostar company Merkur, which used to be the owner of the department store. As for the construction of the church, the location belongs to the Islamic Community and used to be the site of one of the largest Mostar harems, the Laksic harem.

If to this we add the fact that all the road blocks and obstacles in the western part of Mostar have not yet been removed, then the impression of the situation in this city, despite some progress, becomes clearer. [passage omitted]

B-H: Serb, Muslim, Croat Military Meet With Gen Jackson

AU0503220196 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 5 Mar 96

[Report by Milka Tosic on meeting among Serb, Muslim, and Croat military representatives and General Jackson near Kljuc on 5 March]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Military representatives of the Serb, Muslim, and Croat sides discussed the implementation of the military part of the Dayton accord with General Michael Jackson, commander of IFOR [Implementation Force] sector southwest, in (?Zvorno) near Kljuc, on Muslim territory, today. Milka Tosic has a report.

[Tosic] Lieutenant Gen. Momir Talic, commander of the 1st Krajina Corps of the Army of the Serb Republic, was head of the Serb side at this one-and-a-half-hour meeting. He said the following about today's meeting:

[Begin Talic recording] It mainly concerned the agreement that should be implemented after 90 days, which is the transfer of the territory in accordance with the Dayton accord [end Talic].

[Tosic] Gen. Talic responded to a reporter's observation on this being the first meeting on the Muslim side since Gen. Djukic's arrest by saying that there were no problems in organizing the arrival to the Muslim territory, and added:

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[Begin Talic] You see that the arrest paints a very bad picture of the Hague Tribunal's work, which has arrested innocent people and is trying to prove they are guilty, but cannot. This is a [word indistinct] of an organization that must consider its organization and activity from several positions of different standards and different injustices [sentence as heard] [end Talic recording].

[Tosic] In his statement to reporters after the meeting, Gen. Michael Jackson pointed out that there are no problems in implementing the military part of the agreement. [passage omitted]

Even with IFOR's guarantees, which accompanied us, the Muslim side did not allow the Serb Radio and Television team to record anything after entering Kljuc. They had to leave the town immediately, escorted by the police.

Vehicles of the Muslim-Croat Federation and buses going from Sarajevo-Bihac were on the other side, on the road that was once called the AVNOJ [Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia] road.

B-H: Impasse Between Muslim, Croat Leaders in Bugojno

LD05032201 96 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2153 GMT 5 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 5 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Muslim and Croat political leaders in Bugojno, central Bosnia, parted on Tuesday without accord on how to implement the constitution of their binational federation to comply with the Dayton peace accord.

Muslim Radio Sarajevo said that the meeting of the municipal leaders of the Muslim Democratic Action Party and the Croatian Democratic Union had ended in total failure.

The Muslims made their consent to the 1,150 Croats remaining in Bugojno conditional on the settlement of the status of the Muslims in the Croat-held towns of Vitez and Busovaca.

The allies in the war against the Bosnian Serbs could not agree, either, about Muslims' return to the central Bosnian town of Jajce, because the Croats insisted on a reciprocal simultaneous return of Croats to Bugojno and Travnik.

The Muslims challenged the validity of the Croatian Democratic Union's rule in Bugojno, won in pre-war elections, saying the town was now predominantly Muslim-populated.

Under the Washington accord that set up the Muslim-Croat Federation and the binational federation's constitution in 1994, the municipalities should be ruled by the parties that won the 1990 multi-party elections.

The 1994 Washington accord, brokered by the United States, ended 14 months of bitter fighting for territories between the Muslims and Croats in Bosnia and set up their federation.

B-H: IFOR Escorts Federal Police From Hadzici Station

AU0603092996 Paris AFP in English 0904 GMT 6 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, March 6 (AFP)—A group of Bosnian Croat police who occupied a police station in a Serb-held Sarajevo suburb overnight, were escorted out of the building by peacekeeping troops early Wednesday [6 March], witnesses said.

Some 20 Croat officers entered the police station in Hadzici late Tuesday evening.

UN police, in the district due to be handed over to mainly-Moslem Bosnian government authority Wednesday morning, asked NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) troops to assist.

"A company of 120 French soldiers were sent to the suburb and surrounded the building, ordering the Croats to leave before 9:00 AM (0800 GMT)," Major Richard Pernod, a spokesman for IFOR, said Wednesday.

Witnesses said that some 18 men, 15 in police uniform and three in civilian clothing, were escorted out of the building 20 minutes before the deadline.

They were escorted out by IFOR troops.

UN police commissioner Peter Fitzgerald said: "There was no trouble. They eventually left."

Hadzici, 15 kilometres (nine miles) west of Sarajevo, is the third rebel held district to revert to government control under Bosnia's Dayton peace accord. Thousands of Serbs who lived in the area have fled in recent days ahead of the transfer.

Some tension has accompanied the exodus however. An IFOR officer who declined to be named said late Tuesday that the Hadzici town hall had been set on fire.

A 90-man squad of Federation police made up of 70 Moslems, 15 Serbs and five Croats will start patrolling the area Wednesday. Their numbers, drawn up under arrangements agreed with the UN police force which is monitoring their work, reflects the pre-war population of Hadzici.

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Apparently, the Croats were furious because they considered they were under-represented in the force.

Croats accounted for 3.1 per cent of Hadzici's population according to the country's last census in 1991.

B-H: Bosnian Police Take 'Control' of Hadzici

AU0603112796 Paris AFP in English 1027 GMT 6 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SARAJEVO, March 6 (AFP)—Mainly Moslem Bosnian government police Wednesday took control of a third Sarajevo suburb deserted in recent weeks by thousands of Serbs fearful of reprisals, UN police said.

The group of 71 police from Bosnia's Moslem-Croat federation arrived at about 10:30 a.m. (0930 GMT) in the western suburb of Hadzici.

The police force, made up of 51 Moslems, 15 Serbs and five Croats, replaced the Serb authorities who quit the town in recent days, in line with the transfer of five Sarajevo suburbs from the Serb Republic to the Moslem-Croat federation.

The Bosnian authorities had intended to bring about 90 police into Hadzici but had had difficulty in finding sufficient numbers to meet the quota because of strict criteria laid down for inclusion in the new force, UN police said.

The transfer of five suburbs around Sarajevo was agreed at Bosnian peace talks in Dayton, Ohio, last November. Under that treaty, the federation shares Bosnia 51 to 49 percent with the rebel Serbs' Serb Republic.

B-H: Interior Minister, Federal Police Enter Hadzici

AU0603120196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 6 Mar 96

[Report by Fuad Cibukcic from Hadzici—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] Esteemed listeners, greetings from Hadzici. The federal police forces, headed by Interior Minister Avdo Hebib, entered Hadzici at approximately 1040 [0940 GMT]. The delay was caused by poor road conditions on the Mt. Igman route via which we traveled to Hadzici.

Several thousand expelled Hadzici residents entered the district together with the police; the people did not hide their enthusiasm at returning home after four years of exile.

The police officers are currently taking up their respective assignments. We have to say that the building housing the municipal authorities was still smoldering when municipal chairman Mustafa Dzelilovic put up a plaque saying: Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hadzici Municipality.

According to the information that we received from the municipal authorities, industrial installations like the Coca Cola plant, and Remontni Zavod [overhaul facility] have been completely devastated. [passage indistinct]

[Announcer] ...hello, can you hear us?

[Cibukcic] Yes, I hear you, there were some technical problems. Please go ahead.

[Announcer] We thank our correspondent Fuad Cibukcic, and we continue with the Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina midday news.

B-H: Serbs Claim IFOR Watching as Croats Loot Blagaj

AU0603143096 Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI in Serbo-Croatian 5 Mar 96 p 4

[Report by M. Ma.: "Foreigners Still in One's Birthplace"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the Dayton agreement, almost the entire local community of Blagaj, which belongs to the Kupres Municipality and is 45 square kilometers in size, belongs to the Serb Republic. The five-month long presence of the Croatian Army and the HVO [Croat Defense Council] on this territory is everywhere to be seen. More than 70 percent of the residential buildings have been burned down. The church and the priest's home have been blown up.

Blagaj citizens have been coming back all the time, but only to smell their land as there are still no conditions for their safe return. Namely, HVO police have been observed in some parts of Blagaj on several occasions. Kupres Croats have still not satisfied their urge to loot, so they looted whatever had been left under the very eyes of the owners. Over the last few days, hay is being systematically removed from hamlets near the border with the Muslim-Croat federation. All this is being done in the presence of IFOR [Implementation Force] members, who are doing nothing to stop it.

According to Luka Lugonja, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Kupres Municipality, a huge majority of Blagaj citizens want to return to their homes. Those people whose houses remained undamaged would have done so immediately. However, the noted incursions of HVO members and Croats from nearby Croatian villages into our territory create a certain insecurity among the people.

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We have talked with representatives of the Banja Luka security services center, who proposed that the nearest public security station in Sipovo open a checkpoint or branch in Blagaj, but nothing has been done as yet. Such a police presence is necessary not only for the security of the returnees, but also because of the rich forests in the region and preparations for opening the Kupres Forestry Combine. I believe that the opening of the police checkpoint, as well as better weather conditions, will create a more favorable climate for life and for repairing damaged houses, Lugonja said.

B-H: HDZ Accused of Stirring Mostar-Type Conflict

AU0503160496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 5 Mar 96

[Report by Nada al Issa from Zagreb]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Croatian media are full of commentaries on the artificially created Sarajevo crisis such as: The Party of Democratic Action [SDA] wants a single-nation canton in which there will be no room for the Croats.

SLOBODNA DALMACIJA carries the statement by Federation President Kresimir Zubak that the SDA wants a state in which, according to him, the Croats would have the status like the one Arabs have in France. The proportional system of authority would allegedly endanger the Croats. However, this is the very system that the Republic of Croatia is introducing in the newly liberated areas. They claim that this system is a true European solution for the Croatian Serbs. If the proportional system is a European solution for the Croatian Serbs, why should it not be the same for the Sarajevo Croats?

The opposition says that the Sarajevo Croats have been caught up in the well-known Serb syndrome, that they are all endangered [word indistinct]. In the Republic of Croatia, one should not forget, this Serb syndrome started the war.

In Zagreb they are still talking about irreconcilable political concepts in Bosnia-Herzegovina between the federation partners. SLOBODNA DALMACIJA carries the statement by Kresimir Zubak, saying that, unless these opposing concepts are solved, they could instigate a new war. However, how can one reconcile anything in Bosnia-Herzegovina while, for example, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats want exclusive and ethnically pure areas? This is the source of all the misunderstanding from the outset of the conflict between the Croats and Bosniaks. That is how it started in Mostar, and some, it appears, would like to go through all that again in Sarajevo.

B-H: Croat Body Assails Muslim 'Unilateral Measures'

LD0503181096 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 5 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The presidency of the Croat Democratic Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina held its 27th session in Mostar today under the chairmanship of Chairman Bozo Rajic. The session was devoted to examining reports by Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Jozo Leotar, deputy minister of internal affairs of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, on relations with our federation partner, the Bosnian-Muslim side, in the process of establishing the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It was concluded that the partner side has been taking unilateral measures, which are contrary to provisions of agreements previously signed, such as the introduction of a single-nation police force under the name of federal police into the wider area of Sarajevo; unconstitutional decisions on the setup of Sarajevo; the creation of parallel institutions of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina aimed at paralyzing relevant bodies of the federation; and a complete lack of interest in creating working and living conditions for Croat federal officials in the bodies of administration of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the transition period.

The presidency has decided to hold a separate session devoted to further examination of the aforementioned issues on 11 March, after which it will take necessary measures in order to overcome the newly created situation and to inform all the important international players about actions of our federal partner.

B-H: Koljevic on Possible Bosnian Serb-FRY Merger

LD0503175996 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1732 GMT 5 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Podgorica, March 5 (TANJUG)—Vice President of the Republika Srpska Nikola Koljevic has said that a continuation of Muslim and Croat hostile behaviour towards the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina could trigger a Serb referendum and their merger with neighbouring Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY].

In an interview with the Podgorica paper ISTOK, Koljevic was asked to comment on a statement by former U.S. State Department official Richard Holbrooke who has said that he was haunted by nightmarish thoughts that the Serbs in Bosnia would act properly for some time but that they would later secede and merge with Serbia which was not allowed by the Dayton accords.

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Under the Dayton peace accords, the Republika Srpska [RS], the Serb state in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is an entity forming a union in that former Yugoslav republic, with the Muslim-Croat federation.

Koljevic said that, in the RS hierarchy, he preferred not to take the place of President Radovan Karadzic and that the issue whether he would replace Karadzic was manipulated for various reasons.

One of the possible reasons may be the international community's wish to bet on or count on someone who would be more "flexible," Koljevic said.

They have probably gained such an impression on me on the basis of talks on humanitarian issues. I do not believe that they could have gained such an impression in negotiations on political issues, Koljevic said.

Koljevic maintains that the people should be left to decide on the issue and that candidates should be promoted from the inside and not from the outside.

Under the Dayton accords, elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina should be held by September 1996.

Koljevic believes that an impersonalization of authorities will occur in new circumstances and after democratic elections. He said that during war the existence of only one command was normal and that the presidential system had been suitable.

Koljevic said that it was now legitimate to raise the issue whether now in peace, when there was no more need for one command and strict pyramid of rule, the parliamentary system and impersonalization of authorities were more suitable.

Koljevic said that ahead of the upcoming elections it was of crucial importance that political parties and other factors reach consensus on two issues: to prevent an annulment of the results of the 3 1/2-year war, that is the Republika Srpska and its degree of statehood obtained in Dayton and to reach consensus on national policy in which the Serbs would never be manipulated again.

B-H: Koljevic Discusses Recent Visit to France

AU0603124496 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 6 Mar 96 p 5

[Interview with Serb Republic Vice President Nikola Koljevic by "E.B." on 5 March; place not given: "Peacetime Requires a Different Kind of Aid"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [VESTI] Serb Republic [RS] Vice President Nikola Koljevic yesterday kindly responded to VESTI's appeal to clarify for our readers the goals and results of his visit and meetings with our people in the diaspora. What was the goal of your visit to France?

[Koljevic] We received significant support from our people in France. In addition to the public round table, at which significant funds were collected, we also made contact with French friends who wish to help us; thus, a convoy is in preparation in the Paris suburbs that will soon set out for the RS. Moreover, Limousin offered to set up an experimental dairy in the Romanija region, where we would apply French experience in the production of cheese and dairy products.

[VESTI] Is France interested in helping reconstruct the RS in other ways as well?

[Koljevic] Today, together with the Yugoslav Embassy in Paris, we are supposed to meet with top French representatives, since Paris promised to help us build hospitals and a school in the Pale area, as part of the reconstruction program that also includes the RS. If we are given guarantees that the programs will go ahead, we can conclude that our visit to France was extremely successful.

[VESTI] It seems that the time has come for a different kind of aid from abroad, that is, the kind of aid that will open perspectives, provide new jobs....

[Koljevic] We discussed this as well in Paris, and we believe that the war tax our people in the diaspora paid during the war should be lifted, and that some aspects of humanitarian aid—primarily medicine—can be suspended as are needs are no longer great. Our current priority are commercial donations and investments for reviving production and launching economic installations. This primarily pertains to three brick manufacturing plants in Prijedor. We need 700,000 German marks to launch the production of roof tiles in the plant, and it is well-known that roof tiles are literally the most important article at the moment.

[VESTI] Has there been talk about closer contact between the mother country and Serbs from the RS in diaspora, in the form of information centers, for example?

[Koljevic] We have discussed this recently. We are trying to solve the issue of premises. In certain European centers we have SRNA agency offices, and we could turn them into information centers, which would also serve as places for organizing and establishing contact among our people. We have also discussed launching a radio station in France, and I hope VESTI will help us with this.

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B-H: Karadzic's SDS Trying To Resettle Serbs in Brcko

AU0503182596 Paris AFP in English 1809 GMT 5 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 5 (AFP)—Serbs who have left homes in Sarajevo should be resettled in Brcko, northeast Bosnia, in order to persuade international arbitrators to "award" the town to the Serbs, the Serb nationalist party said Tuesday [5 March].

The future of Brcko, a formerly mainly-Moslem town in the northern Posavina corridor which is claimed by both the Serbs and the mainly-Moslem Bosnian Government, is to be decided later this year by arbitrators picked under the Dayton peace agreement.

Lying on a north-south rail route vital to the Moslems and an east-west land corridor vital to the Serbs, it is seen as a key issue by both.

Tuesday, a local committee of Serb leader Radovan Karadzic's ruling Serb Democratic Party (SDS) said money should be put into repairing former Moslem homes in Brcko for Serbs to be resettled there, the independent BETA news agency said.

The SDS in Bijeljina, northeast Bosnia, said in a statement that this would strongly influence the final settlement of the Brcko issue, BETA said.

The local party also called on the Serb authorities to name Brcko "capital" of the Serb Republic.

"We know that the (Serbs') government and presidency would have better working conditions in Banja Luka and that Bijeljina would be the better solution geographically, but the wisest decision politically would be to proclaim Brcko capital," said a statement cited by Beta.

Banja Luka, in northwest Bosnia, is the Serbs' largest town. Bijeljina is the closest major town to the border with Serbia.

To date, several hundred Sarajevo Serbs have been resettled in the Brcko region but several thousand more are expected, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross in Belgrade.

Thousands of Serbs have in recent weeks left five districts around Sarajevo which are due to return to the control of the mainly Moslem government.

International agencies have accused the hardline Serb leadership of deliberately provoking the Serb exodus by exaggerating fears of reprisals by Moslem authorities for the brutal siege of Sarajevo.

B-H: Karadzic Asks Serb Expatriates for Donations

AU0603152996 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 6 Mar 96 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Be Among the First To Build"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, addressed his "Appeal for Assistance in Providing for Serb Expellees" to Serbs in the diaspora, as, the appeal says, there are more than half a million expellees in the Serb Republic and "the same number in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."

"Dear brothers in the diaspora, in the course of the previous war cataclysm more than a million Serbs have been expelled from their centuries-old homes since 1991 solely because they were Serbs, the majority with nothing but a bundle in their hand.

"To judge from everything, the war is over. The Serb Republic, the youngest of the Serbian states, which has finally been internationally recognized, is facing an enemy encirclement as well as an uncertain and difficult peace. Exhausted by a horrific civil war, isolated and impoverished, it is not in a position to provide for the expellees' most elementary needs: roofs over their heads to help them make it through the winter, and then homes, so that they might remain here and build a modern, democratic country for themselves, their descendants, and also for the entire Serbian people," the appeal says.

Karadzic emphasizes that "crucial at this moment is the question of accommodation for the residents of Serb Sarajevo."

"Because of the imminent transfer of authority from the authorities of the Serb Republic to the Muslim-Croatian federation, the majority of Serbs in Sarajevo are already leaving their homes, apartments, and property. If we fail to provide them with at least some sort of accommodation on the territory of the Serb Republic and the conditions to build homes in a new place, they will face a bleak and uncertain future as emigres. However, the Serb Republic is in danger of losing its most precious asset, namely, those who defended and safeguarded freedom," the Serb Republic president warned.

At the end of the appeal Karadzic said:

"We are expecting the most valuable and speediest assistance to resolve those issues that are vital for the survival of the Serb Republic and its residents from you who have been with us in heart, soul, and mind from the very beginning, who know best what it means to leave one's home, one's country...from Serbs scattered all over the world who carry the motherland in their hearts. We have fought this war for you, too, and without you

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we would definitely have lost it. In this noble way, with donations for the repairs and construction of homes for the expelled Serb population, you will concretely and also symbolically become the first friends of the youngest Serbian state."

B-H: RS Official Denies Agreement on Territory Exchange

AU0503094396 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 1 Mar 96 p 4

[Article by M. Kusmuk: "Lukavica Is Not Meant for Exchange"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In a statement for VESTI, Velibor Ostojic, chairman of the Serb Republic's [RS] state commission for the demarcation between the entities, denied a report in DNEVNI TELEGRAF that the RS and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina are close to reaching agreement on the exchange of Gorazde for some parts of Sarajevo.

According to the DNEVNI TELEGRAF report, which is based on a statement by a local official in Serb Gorazde, the RS is prepared to give Lukavica, Vojkovici, Tilava, Kasindol, and the parts of the Sarajevo area assigned to the Serbs by the Dayton accords to the Federation in exchange for Gorazde, thus naturally linking Herzegovina with the Drina basin, whereas the Muslims would have a compact territory in Sarajevo.

"The Serb Republic's state commission for demarcation has never raised the question of the exchange of territories at any of its talks with the other side," Ostojic says, adding: "This is deliberate misinformation that may have another objective—to cause panic among the Serb population settled in the parts of the Sarajevo area assigned to the Serb Republic by the Dayton accords, in order to encourage them to move out again."

Some foreign newspapers have recently reported that Trnovo is to be exchanged for Praca. The Serb Republic's state commission did offer Trnovo to the Federation in exchange for Gorazde, and such a talk did indeed take place, but the Muslims refused this possibility. "The parts of Serb Sarajevo in the south sector are extremely important. Around 30,000 people are already living there, and nobody has ever discussed any such possibility," Ostojic says.

He adds that it has been noticed in the demarcation commission's work so far that there has been a constant forcing of certain attitudes by local negotiators, but they have never had such authorization in the negotiations.

B-H: Serbs Violate Water-Supplies Agreement for Gorazde

AU0503194496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 5 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At the meeting between the delegation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic and Federation Governments and the representatives of the government of the Serb entity held on 27 February in Banja Luka it was agreed, as is well known, that on 3 March the waterworks would be made operational to supply Gorazde regularly with water.

However, the Serbs have not respected this agreement. As we have found out from Carl Bildt's office, the reason the representatives of the Serb entity have not complied with the agreement is war damage to the waterworks. However, the real reason lies in the uncooperativeness of the Serb side and the willfullness of Dusko Kornjaca, a self-declared warlord from Cajnice, who is not allowing the waterworks, which are in good repair, by the way, to be put into operation. This was said in a statement from the office of the prime minister of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

A protest has also been lodged from Prime Minister Kapetanovic's office with Carl Bildt, the high representative for the implementation of the Dayton agreement, who had also attended the talks in Banja Luka, demanding that he take all necessary measures to force the Serb side to comply with the agreement and put the waterworks for Gorazde in operation.

B-H: Socialist Party of Serbia's International Contacts

AU0403213996 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 4 Mar 96

[Statement by Igor Radojicic, member of the Main Committee of the Serb Republic branch of the Socialist Party of Serbia and head of the Commission for International Cooperation and Relations with Other Parties; place and date not given—recorded] txt) [FBIS Translated Text] The delegation of the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic [RS] that participated in the work of the 3d Congress of the Socialist Party of Serbia in Belgrade had several high-level international contacts. We talked to the representatives of both eastern and western influential political parties, among which I would like to mention: the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, PASOK, the strongest Cypriot political party AKEL, the Social Democratic Party of Austria, the Socialist Party of Belgium, Labor Party parliamentarians from the United Kingdom, the

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Congress Party of India, the Communist Party of Italy, and so forth.

Therefore, we had a very varied program, the goal of which was to present ourselves, for the first time in an organized manner, on the international political scene. I must say without any exaggeration that we were a first class political revelation for all our collocutors, as they have very little information on the RS, and the little that they have is mostly black and white. That is why they expressed great interest in the existence of a strong and already influential socialist party in the RS. We left open the possibility of further contact with all of them, and they are all very interested in coming to visit the RS and the RS Socialists.

B-H: RS Official Requests More Aid for Sarajevo Refugees

LD0603153896 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1430 GMT 6 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bijeljina, 6 March (SRNA)—Dragan Kekic, the commissioner of the Serb Republic's commission for refugees, told SRNA today that "more than 40 reception centers have been opened in the Serb Republic [RS], providing accommodation for about 10,000 evacuated citizens of Serb Sarajevo."

Kekic said that accommodation for about 30,000 citizens of Sarajevo had been found in abandoned houses or with friends and relatives. He said that the number of evacuated citizens of Serb Sarajevo was increasing daily.

"That is why we are planning to open new reception centers in the eastern part of the Serb Republic, from Zvornik to Visegrad, and schools will be closed down in these municipalities," he pointed out.

Kekic warned that "the exodus of Sarajevo Serbs is not being accompanied by the promised reconstruction of residential buildings in the Serb Republic," and recalled that the UNHCR had given firm assurances that deliveries of building material would begin soon.

"There is a lack of necessary goods in the reception centers and we are calling on all humanitarian organizations to intervene as soon as possible in order to secure sufficient supplies of food, medicine, toiletries, blankets, and mattresses," Kekic said.

B-H: Sarajevo Serbs in Srebrenica Lack Accommodations

AU0503215496 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 5 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] President of the Srebrenica municipal assembly's housing committee, (?Nego Jevtic), stated today that efforts are being made to find accommodation for refugees from Ilijas.

About 2,000 people who do not wish to live under Muslim-Croat authority have arrived from this Sarajevo municipality. Finding vacant housing space is very difficult, since about 6,000 refugees from the western parts of the Serb Republic arrived in Srebrenica last fall.

B-H: Authorities Expect Mass Graves in Sarajevo Districts

AU0503140396 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 5 Mar 96 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Mass Graves in Ilidza and Grbavica"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 5 March—Mirsad Tokaca, the secretary of the State Commission for the Collection of War Crimes Evidence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, has stated that the reintegration of certain parts of Sarajevo into the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina also meant the chance to analyze war crimes evidence collected so far.

"Our goal is to establish and expound some facts that we have collected in the field," Tokaca stated. According to him, the Federation police have not yet entered the area of the Svrake and Semizovac villages, where, according to eyewitness accounts, two major mass graves of Bosniaks and Croats are located.

"The images of mass graves of Bosniaks in Ahatovici village have already been shown by major television channels worldwide. It is assumed that in Grbavica and Ilidza [Serb-occupied districts of Sarajevo] such graves exist as well. After the definite transfer of these two districts (Grbavica and Ilidza) to the authority of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the State Commission will take up the huge work of analyzing and expounding data on war crimes," Tokaca said.

B-H: Srbac Businesses Apply for World Bank Loans

AU0503190196 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 29 Feb 96

[Report by Savo Keser]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Most state-owned and private firms, social enterprises, and institutions in the Srbac municipality submitted projects to obtain World Bank loans for rebuilding and development of the Serb Republic before the deadline. As stated at the extended session of the municipal government attended by representatives of the municipality's businesses, all projects rest

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on realistic projections, which should be the main requirement in selecting development programs and granting loans, both at the level of Chamber of Commerce and the government, as well as on the level of financial institutions. [passage omitted]

The decision of the UN Security Council to lift sanctions against the Serb Republic, which was followed by the restoration of payment operations and commodity exchange with the FRY was another reason to hold a meeting with Srbac businessmen. Not counting too much on the financial assistance promised by the international community, Srbac firms are preparing for revitalization of production. Contacts with former business partners as well as with suppliers and buyers have been resumed, contacts with new partners have been established, and the Srbac wood processing industry did most to that end. This firm, as well as many others, can catch up with the prewar production in a short time and it is also preparing its investment program for the finalization of product, i.e. the opening of a plant for manufacturing chairs which was submitted in hope of obtaining international financial assistance.

B-H: LBO Expresses Concern About Election Rules

AU0603123096 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (Europe edition) in Serbo-Croatian 6 Mar 96 p 7

[Report by "N.M.": "Bosnia-Herzegovina Is Moving Closer to Denouement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The topic of the regular news conference by the LBO [Liberal Bosniak Organization] was the latest events in our country. As stated, Bosnia-Herzegovina is finally moving closer to the denouement of an almost 50-year-old drama. According to LBO Vice President Salih Foco, we are facing a situation in which it is not known whether the denouement will end in a democratic way or whether it will lead us in new conflicts.

"It is clear that the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina survival cannot be solved through conflicts and wars. For this reason, the forces of peace will again be in confrontation with the forces of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is obvious that the role of the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina is that of an arbiter and that it is leaving the decision on Bosnia's future to its citizens to make," Foco said.

According to LBO, it is clear that nothing will come from the OSCE's announced financial aid for elections and independent media.

"It is obvious that we will find ourselves in an unfavorable position in which the forces of war will tip the scales. I am primarily referring to the terrorist SDS [Serb Democratic Party], which will have its television and radio programs, as well as funds for the preelection campaigning. The HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] and the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] will also exploit these. Unless the election rules are changed, the LBO, together with some other opposition parties, will announce that it does not want to take part in the upcoming elections."

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Croatia: Tudjman Receives Czech Prime Minister

LD0503191896 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 5 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus has paid an official visit to Zagreb. President Tudjman received the Czech prime minister and members of the governmental delegation this evening. Zeljko Raic has a report from the presidential palace:

[Raic, in progress] ...was not satisfactory. But thanks to the visit by Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus to Zagreb, and after this evening's reception by President Tudjman, new directions in the overall improvement are obvious.

An important topic was the cause of the crisis in the whole region, more precisely in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. President Tudjman explained to the Czech prime minister the historical reasons that led to the aggression against Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is of particular importance as Czech soldiers were members of UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] and are also members of IFOR [Implementation Force] now.

Croatia: Serbs Cite Galbraith Backing Settlement of Srijem

AU0503182896 Beli Manastir Televizija Republike Srpske Krajine in Serbo-Croatian 1915 GMT 4 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Jacques Klein's statement for Croatian television that at most 50 families have settled in the Srem [Serb rendering of Srijem]-Baranja district was not enough for the Zagreb regime's media to stop their raging propaganda campaign against the invasion of Serbs on the Croatian Danube River basin, as they call it. This was probably the main reason behind the following statement Peter Galbraith gave for yesterday's issue of VJESNIK:

"All Serbs from other parts of Croatia have every right to remain in the district."

The U.S. ambassador to Zagreb also said: "The agreement says that the Krajina Serbs can settle in the Srem-Baranja district. They have a right to come to the district, because they find it hard to return to their Krajina homes." The U.S. diplomat warned that the UN Security Council, in a presidential statement read by Madeleine Albright, condemned the snail's pace at which the Croatian Government handles applications of Serb refugees, but it has also unveiled yet another deceit of Zagreb's progovernment newspapers. Galbraith says: "Those Serbs living in the houses of Croats in the area controlled by international transition authorities will not have to leave those houses or apartments until satisfactory alternative housing is provided for them." "The Croatian Government undertook to find suitable housing for the Serbs in Croatian houses, i.e. to give financial assistance to the Serbs to rebuild their homes," Galbraith recalled. The U.S. diplomat, unlike the Croatian press, commended the Serb side for its willingness to cooperate and the readiness of the local Serb authorities to cooperate in the joint commission for the implementation of the agreement. Galbraith told Zagreb VJESNIK yesterday: "I do not believe that there will be any problems regarding the demilitarization of the district, but difficulties can be expected in the establishment of the temporary police. It will be hard to find a model under which Serb and Croatian policemen will work together, but that must happen."

Croatia: Croatian Serb Refugees Protest Murders, Looting

LD0503160296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1457 GMT 5 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 5 Mar (SRNA)—The Banja Luka-based Association of Serb Refugees from the Republic of Croatia lodged a protest with the Croatian authorities in Zagreb today accusing them of tolerating continuing murders and the looting and burning of Serb property in the occupied parts of the Republic of Serb Krajina.

The association was informed that, after horrendous crimes in the village of Varivode and other villages in the Knin Krajina, Croatian extremists and organized groups recently began to murder the remaining Serbs and destroy Serb property in the region.

"The Croatian authorities did nothing to indicate that they were not behind these criminal raids and were not trying to sanction the unacceptable behavior by their extremists," the protest says.

Croatia: Serb Leaders Play Down Appearance of Kuna

AU0503162396 Beli Manastir Televizija Republike Srpske Krajine in Serbo-Croatian 1915 GMT 4 Mar 96

[Unattributed commentary]

[FBIS Translated Text] Unfounded and unconfirmed rumors that the Croatian kuna is a legal means of payment in the region have recently been circulating among the people in our region. Of course, that has nothing to do with reality. The Yugoslav dinar is and will remain the one and only means of payment in the Srijem-Baranja district.

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UN representative Douglas (Kofman) issued a statement about that today. "UN members have not been instructed to use the Croatian currency on the territory of the Srijem-Baranja district," Sector East spokesman Douglas (Kofman) said in Erdut today. The statement was made to relieve the anxiety of the people in the district after UN members attempted to pay for goods and services with the Croatian kuna. Two such cases have been registered so far. In the Danube Hotel in Vukovar, a UN member offered to pay for his lunch with a 10-kuna bill, which the personnel kindly declined to accept. Something like that happened at the Vukovar market, but the saleswoman, believing she was being paid in German marks, accepted the Croatian bill. There has not been any official reaction to the appearance of the kuna in Vukovar.

Slavko Dokmanovic, president of the Srijem-Baranja district council, has two explanations for those cases. It is either a provocation backed by the Croats, or just a mistake, as UN members use the kuna almost every day in Osijek, Vinkovci, and other nearby Croatian towns. The media in Osijek and Vinkovci immediately interpreted the appearance of the kuna in Vukovar as proof that the Croatian state functions in the Croatian Danube River basin [Hrvatsko Podunavlje], which is more than nonsensical. The Erdut agreement, which practically establishes the two-year UN transitional administration, does not say a word about which currency will be used in the Srijem-Baranja district. This as well as other similar details are to be defined in the course of the transitional period, i.e. following the elections held after the transition period.

Croatia: Grujic Discusses Talks on Missing Persons

AU0603103096 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 4 Mar 96 p 7

[Interview with Major Ivan Grujic, President of the Croatian Government's Committee for the Detained and Missing: "Belgrade Is Concealing Information about 1,700 Dead"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

We Expect Klein's Assistance

[Priscan] What information does your committee actually want from so-called Yugoslavia and what did you negotiate at your last meeting in Belgrade?

[Grujic] We are demanding from Yugoslavia that it reveal the fate of the people who were detained, became missing, or were forcefully abducted in the years 1991 and 1992, for which the so-called JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] is responsible. At the same time we are demanding that all the persons Croatia has been looking for be released from detention in so-called Yugoslavia regardless of what criminal offense their indictment is based on. Belgrade is in possession of medical records that will identify those who were murdered, that is, deceased persons we have been searching for from the region of eastern Slavonia, but also even from western Slavonia and Banovina. They have identified 1,400 persons. They have data also on 300 unidentified persons. Colonel Stankovic has talked about that on Belgrade television, and we had known previously that they possessed those records. We insist on their giving us those records. First of all, however, we insist that they release all the persons from our list of the missing and, in the spirit of the Dayton agreement, that they influence the Bosnian Serbs to release all detainees in the territory of Bosnia.

[Priscan] Are there any detained Croats in the still occupied territory of Croatia? What progress has been made in the process of locating the missing since General Klein became contemporary administrator in Croatian Podunavlje [the Danube river basin]?

[Grujic] We know that there are prisons in Dalj, Vukovar, and Beli Manastir. There are signs of other places where detainees were hidden, taken to labor... But until we receive official information about that from General Klein, who will be allowed access to prisons, we will not have a clear picture.

The arrival of General Klein in eastern Slavonia has certainly opened new opportunities in searching for the missing. The Klein administration can put pressure on the Serbs, and finding out the truth about the missing is the precondition to the normalization of relations. The deputy prime minister of the Government, Professor Kostovic is in direct contact with Gen. Klein, who has firsthand information about our requests.

More Than 20 Persons Found

[Priscan] Professor Kostovic has reported to the National Assembly that since January four persons have been released, 16 have been found in the liberated territories of Croatia, three have been found in the temporarily occupied region, and the body of one Croat has been found after the Croatian liberation operations. Who are these people whose fates have been established?

[Grujic] The last person was released in the former Sector East the other day. He was a Croat who has lived in the free territory of Croatia and was arrested by paramilitary Serb formations in the vicinity of Tenjski Antunovac last year. He had been detained in Vukovar and Beli Manastir. Before him, two defenders seized during Operation Storm, and a boy (born 1978) seized in the region of Vrhovine in May, and detained in Knin.

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had also been released. The boy had gotten lost and they tried him for espionage!

We have found sixteen persons in the liberated territory after Operations Flash and Storm. The search procedure was initiated for them. They were living in temporarily occupied territory, but they had no contact with their families. For them, as well as for the three persons who were found in the occupied territory of Podunavlje, we had been searching since 1991. The three persons found in eastern Slavonia have established contact with their families by the mediation of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Unfortunately, one of the persons from our list has been found dead in the newly liberated territory.

[Priscan] Recently, the families of the seven from Ernestinovo, who had been sought since 1991 received the worst message—that their loved are no longer alive. The Serbs had announced the delivery of their bodies, but they have not appeared at the meeting point...

[Grujic] We know that those seven Croatian defenders were killed in Ernestinovo in 1991. The opposing side has confirmed it to us. They have even given us the names of the dead and agreed to deliver us their bodies. Although we have had clear agreement about that on several occasions, the Serbs have not

fulfilled their promise. The last time they got around our agreement was on 25 January. However, we are persistent. The current process in the Croatian Podunavlje shows that the Serbs will be forced to fulfill the agreement. If they do not do so, we will, I hope, be there very soon... [passage omitted]

[Lukic] As I understand it, you do not intend to reduce the HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party] to a stable 5 to 8 percent of votes?

[Gotovac] I have already dismissed that by what I have said about the situation in Croatian society—by having invited all the Croats to participate in the establishment of a different Croatia, a Croatia of free people, with a free political life, with efficient institutions of a civic society. Our rich men, for instance, because they are upstart rich, are among the fiercest enemies of liberalism, which is easy to understand: they have not become rich through economic life but through politics, and in that regard liberalism and its ethics are their natural enemies. Our stronghold will be those who really produce, invest, work, trade, accept the risk and games of the modern economy, and become rich in that way, thus making the whole society richer. The liberals in Croatia cannot live after the old liberal motto—we do not win, but we rule. On the contrary, we must win in order to change our society, to enable Croatia to be an organic part of the modern world.

Democracy Is Not a Monologue

[Lukic] Does that mean that you want to turn the HSLS into the major rival of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] again?

[Gotovac] Yes, we do want to replace the HDZ in power, but we cannot be its rival because the HDZ is a movement and we are a party. So, we are, simply, the alternative for Croatia. We will try to achieve our objective with all other parties that participate in our parliamentary life because party pluralism and its variants are the precondition for realizing that objective. As opposed to that, there is one movement in power in Croatia that is the enemy of all parties and thinks of them as the enemies of the state, as instruments for toppling the state, as assistants to foreign powers, intelligence services, and other forms of subversion and sabotage. It is a populist movement with all its habits: the creation of internal and external enemies, the transformation of the army and the police into its instruments, control of the judiciary, equating the movement, nation, state, and leader of that movement. In doing so he invariably uses revolutionary language, talks about toppling instead of replacing, the enemy instead of the opponent, conflict instead of discussion—he forbids, silences, threatens, and in that way he disables democratic life in the country. At the same time, he talks about democracy, by which he means himself and agreement with himself. Democracy, for a movement, is a monologue. One philosopher has said: As it is with the language, so it is with the matter. Obviously, the whole history of the last fifty years is alive in the HDZ. [passage omitted]

Opposition Bloc [passage omitted]

[Lukic] There are certain expectations according to which you should be the person who will unite the opposition into a strong anti-HDZ bloc. After your election to the head of the HSLS, will the cooperation of the oppositional parties look different than so far?

[Gotovac] I cannot answer your question at this moment. I have just been elected head of the party, but I can tell you that I will do everything in order to have good cooperation, to have successful cooperation, in order to avoid being at any moment at the HDZ puppet theater. [passage omitted]

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[Box 1, p 6]

Neocommunists' Putsch

[Lukic] A large number of political messages sent from the recent session of the HDZ Main Board referred to the opposition, even to you yourself. How did you experience those messages?

[Gotovac] As a sudden and utterly undramatic putsch of the neocommunists. The atmosphere at that convention, the appointments, the way of discussing matters, the rhetoric, the principles expressed—all of it looked like a plenary session of the Central Committee [of the Communist Party] on which the enemies of the state are being discussed. Any difference in opinion is condemned. Any criticism of the authorities is forbidden—because criticism is nothing but well-organized sabotage by the internal factors in cooperation with foreign ones, that is, foreign powers and quislings-domestic opposition. The party identifies itself with the nation, it is the final and supreme achievement of its overall history—it has done something nobody had ever done before it. In intimate moments, the leader has revealed that he "had already agreed upon everything with the comrades..." Not even for a moment has the president of the party forgotten that there was no difference at all between his function and the function of the president of the Republic—on the contrary, he has constantly invited the state, Army, police, judiciary, to fulfill their party tasks. If we do not stop the development announced at the plenary session, it will be the end of Croatia's internal freedom. The movement can maintain the independent of Croatia outwards, but inside there will be one ruling movement, one opinion, one leader—in general, it will all be one.

Croatia: No-Confidence Vote on Zagreb Mayor To Be Tabled

LD0503194296 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 5 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with a decision adopted yesterday by the president on the appointment of Marina Matulovic-Dropulic as Zagreb mayor, chairmen of parties that are members of the coalition of seven opposition parties held a session in the old city hall today. Following the meeting Zdravko Tomac, president of the Zagreb City Assembly, made a special statement for Croatian TV:

[begin Tomac recording] At the meeting today the chairmen of the association of seven parties unanimously adopted two important decisions. The first was that we are going to address the public with a statement in which we will very briefly and clearly explain why we do not accept the newly appointed mayor. Not because she is not good, and would not work well, but simply out of principle. We cannot accept that a minority should be given the right to form the executive authorities.

In accordance with this, we accepted a proposal which will be sent to the joint club of deputies of the seven parties to put forward an additional point on the agenda for the Thursday session of the city assembly—to call for a vote of confidence in the Zagreb mayor and to pass a motion of no confidence in her. In accordance with the constitution and the law, this means that we would elect a new mayor and two deputy mayors at the same session, who would then wait to be endorsed by the state president. [end recording]

Croatia: New HSLS Leader on Party, Detainee Issues

AU0603101696 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 3 Mar 96 pp 6-7

[Interview with Vlado Gotovac, newly elected president of the HSLS, by Slavica Lukic; place and date not given: "We Cannot Be a Rival to the HDZ: They Are a Movement and We Are a Party!"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Lukic] Since your election there has been a lot of speculation about whether it was good or bad for the party. Your critics note, for instance, that your public appearance is more appropriate to a populist leader than to the president of a modern liberal party. What do you say to those remarks?

[Gotovac] From the moment our party was defined as the Croatian social and liberal party, it became one of the most modern liberal parties in the world because it fulfilled two basic demands of contemporary liberalism. It accepted the limits of its activity, the limits of the Croatian situation, in a pragmatic manner, having simultaneously preserved its general, we could say, utopian horizon, which is characteristic of any liberalism, because it carries within itself infinite possibilities of a person, its freedom, its dynamics, its uniqueness, and its unrepeatable quality. My public appearance is tuned in according to that. I address every Croat who wants to live in a modern society, in a society that accepts wealth, but refuses poverty, which preaches solidarity among human beings, and mutual responsibility of the members of society and in that way provides freedom and dignity for everyone. [passage omitted]

[Lukic] Your critics claim that you possess a characteristic that can be very embarrassing regarding your new role. They claim that you cannot stand criticism and that you are vengeful toward your opponents. Is there any truth in that?

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[Gotovac] Anyone who defends himself from fierce attacks and slander can easily come out seeming self-satisfied. One can expect that. I will nevertheless say something in my own defense: I have never taken revenge for anything—neither for trials, nor for prosecutions and prison, much less for things written or said. Revenge is banished from my world view: I am deeply convinced that vengefulness destroys primarily the soul of the one who feels vengeful. After all, it is easy to check my actual behavior. In the last five years there is no man in Croatia who has been more attacked and who has been attacked in an uglier manner and more slandered than myself. Check those texts, then check my answers, and you will get the truth.

[Lukic] Do you think that it is good for the HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party] that Drazen Budisa resigned from his leading position in the party?

[Gotovac] A change is always the result of the appraisal of a situation, of all the elements that influence that change. By making a decision on a change, we solve a problem, but we can never be absolutely sure that all the problems will be solved. According to that, the future will tell what is good, and what is bad.

Unpleasant Conflict

[Lukic] Do the disagreements between Mladen Vilfan and Drazen Budisa only have to do with the differences in the view of the internal organization of the party, or are those disagreements of ideological and political nature?

[Gotovac] The polemics have not developed to such proportions that I could give a firm answer to that question. Certainly, the conflict was unpleasant for the party, certainly, Vilfan tried to solve that conflict in an improper way at the party convention. But I am convinced that neither of them will give up working in the party, I am convinced that the party needs both of them, each in his own way.

[Lukic] The opinion exists that a strong personality at the head of the HSLS, and you are indisputably such a person, will only postpone the HSLS's confrontation with its internal problems and slow down its more specific positioning on the Croatian political stage. What do you think about this?

[Gotovac] The position of the HSLS in our political arena has in principal been completely determined already—if this position refers to the general objectives and the way of achieving them. How we behave toward certain issues at a certain moment, depends upon our capabilities, upon the value and accuracy of our assessments. The president has a special responsibility in it. I have said that there is nothing without conflict in life, so nor will our situation be without conflict. Personally, I will gladly accept all the discussions, both principal and pragmatic, and always try to bring them to some conclusion. At the same time I will be very harsh with those who have tried to raise their personal calculations and ambitions to the level of party questions and discussions, particularly if they would do that outside the party. I will demand that all the questions be discussed within the party,

within its bodies, which are there to do this. Only if one such question cannot be solved in that way, then everybody is free to discuss it outside the party, leaving the party. From that moment on, it is no longer a matter of internal party relations, but of relations outside the party.

Unregistered in Prison in Bosnia

[Priscan] Croatia has information about 10 of Croatia's defenders who have been detained in Serb prisons in Bosnia, but the Serbs do not allow the international relief workers to get through to them. Who are those detainees?

[Grujic] These are persons who have been designated to be released according to the Dayton agreement. These are our defenders who have been taken out of Croatia into Bosnia, who were captured in the last liberation actions. Our committee has followed the route the Serbs moved them in from prison to prison and they were not registered by 6 January, so, two days after the Bosnian Serbs delivered the list of detainees to ICRC [the International Committee of the Red Cross]. The International Committee of the Red Cross then registered them in the prisons of Banja Luka and Kotorsko, near Doboj. However, the Serbs have not released those detainees, although the Croatian side has released its detainees. We also know that a certain number of persons captured in Croatian military actions are also in the prisons in Bosnia, but they are not registered. The information on those detainees indicate that it is quite possible that there are some detainees from before in Serbian prisons.

[Box 1, p 7]

Where Are Sumanovac and Peresin?

[Priscan] Recently, the Croatian media have frequently spoken about the Croatian pilots, officers Vladimir Sumanovac and Rudolf Peresin, who are allegedly being detained by the Serbs in Bosnia. Are they alive? Do you know where they are? What are their chances of being released?

[Grujic] Sumanovac was registered by the ICRC in the Banja Luka Military-Investigation Prison early in 1994,

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almost a year after we started to look for him as missing. The family message he sent on the occasion of a brief interview by a Red Cross delegate is unquestionable proof of his detention in the Serb prison. Four months before he was registered, we found out where he was and warned the international organizations about that. Sumanovac was arrested in the territory of Croatia, on the then demarcation line in Turanj, and was transferred from Croatia to Bosnia. They have moved him from prison to prison. On many negotiations we have asked for his registration and liberation. Unfortunately, since he was registered, ICRC has never managed to visit him again. We have a number of witnesses who have been released in prisoner exchanges thanks to whom we have known where Sumanovac was at a certain moment. We have information that Sumanovac is alive at the moment, and we insist that he be released.

To establish the fate of the pilot Peresin will certainly also be very complicated, just as it was difficult to prove that Sumanovac was alive. Peresin has not been registered, but there are indications that he is alive, in the territory of Bosnia, and we have been intensively searching for him.

Croatia: Air Force Academy Head Views Pilot Training

AU0503201796 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 5 Mar 96 p 6

[Interview with Rikard Ferk, commander of the Air Force Academy in Zemunik, by Predrag Oreskovic; place and date not given: "Croatian Pilots Trained on the Western Model"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Brigadier Rikard Ferk has been the head of "Zadar" Air Force Academy in Zemunik since the foundation of this institution. Before he was entrusted with forming the Croatian Air Force Academy, he used to head the Air Force section of the General Staff. He graduated from the Air Force Technical Academy in Rajlovac and from the Faculty of Machine Engineering. Before he entered upon a service with the Croatian Army, he used to teach at the Military Aviation Academy.

[Oreskovic] How is the Air Force Academy organized?

[Ferk] The Air Force Training Center, which is what the academy used to be called in the beginning, was formed in 1992, comprising four schools: the School for Pilots, the School for Air Force Technicians, the School of Air Defense, and the School of Air Surveillance and Guidance. In addition to officers, we are training noncommissioned officers and soldiers here as well. The Academy used to be based at Sepurine before Zemunik was freed. After the freeing of Zemunik airport, and when the first generation of students at the Faculty of Traffic Sciences, who were being trained as pilots for the Croatian Air Force, reached the second year of studies, we moved in here, and began to conduct flights a kilometer away from the front line. Part of the fence encircling our barracks also used to mark a front line. There was no other possibility for us because we had to start working somehow.

[Oreskovic] What is the curriculum of pilot training like, and have you adopted any foreign models of training?

[Ferk] The curriculum of pilot training was devised on the basis of several curricula available to us at the beginning, when the Academy was being formed. We obtained the curriculum from a school in Texas in the United States to see how they work, as well as some curricula from Spain, Great Britain, and Germany. In addition, we were able to see the Hungarian approach within their possible admission to NATO as well. In cooperation with the Faculty of Traffic Sciences we devised our own curriculum, which is rather similar to the foreign ones. Pilots abroad acquire theoretic knowledge at universities, while practical knowledge is acquired through military training. In Croatia the Faculty of Traffic Sciences provides science-based knowledge, while students acquire particular skills through training at the Air Force Academy.

[Oreskovic] Who are your teachers?

[Ferk] Our teachers are some regular and guest professors of Zagreb University. The same applies to other fields of studies at the Air Force Academy. The practical part of training is handled by flying instructors. All of them are people who have already completed between 600 and 1600 hours of flying, which means they are extremely competent. Any pilot of the Croatian Air Force after graduation has a degree in aeronautical engineering, receives a flying permit, and is an officer of the Croatian Army.

[Oreskovic] Are you cooperating with foreign military experts?

[Ferk] Thanks to the defense minister and General Agotic, part of the Academy's staff was able to visit states from which we had initially obtained models of curricula for training pilots. We saw how their schools for training army pilots work. On the basis of those models we have organized our Academy as well to have a modern system of training.

The Most Expensive School

[Oreskovic] What is your experience like with the first generation of cadets pilots, who are supposed to graduate next year?

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[Ferk] You know how it is.... Those young men are actually icebreakers. They are breaking a passage for their colleagues who will come to the Academy after them. The same thing goes for us as well. The majority of us are working for the first time in this field. Today the Republic of Croatia is following the Western model, keeping in mind modern Western aircraft. To achieve that is a demanding task. There are difficulties, but I believe that the Croatian Air Force will succeed in its task, and we shall be able to train our pilots alone.

[Oreskovic] How much does the schooling of one pilot cost?

[Ferk] I cannot tell you precisely how much. We train our pilots on Utva aircraft at the moment. We obtained them either by capturing them or as a gift. Training on Utva aircraft is a cheaper way, but we have to strive for higher standards, a better quality of education for our cadets. This means we are supposed to buy new aircraft. Automatically, the cost of education of any pilot will increase. The most expensive schooling in the world is that of pilots. Today the cost of one experienced combat pilot, whom we have ready only five years after graduation, amounts to at least $2.5 million.

[Oreskovic] What is the future of the Air Force Academy in the Croatian system of military schools?

[Ferk] The idea of the current model of schooling for Croatian officers came from the president of the Republic. The model envisages officers studying at the University, for which we do not need any particular military colleges or academies outside the existing schooling system. I think we should stick to this method in the future as well. The same applies to our Academy. This means that our officers will be studying at the University just like any other students, while a specific part of education will be accomplished within the Croatian Military Academy, that is, for pilots within the Air Force Academy.

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FYROM: Commentary on Moves for Early Elections

AU0503192796 Skopje MIC in English 4 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] If until recently, the idea about early parliamentary elections, with the gathering of 150,000 signatures was only mentioned from time to time, now, it can be said that its advocates are preparing an offensive. The events in the Alliance for Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], which ended with its breakup, served as a catalyst in this situation.

Following the Democratic Party, from the ranks of the out-of-parliament opposition, VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] has also come out in support of the initiative to gather 150,000 signatures of citizens-voters, for a referendum through early elections. Unlike the Democrats, who link the gathering of signatures with the necessary determination of the rules of the game, VMRO-DPMNE takes things further, claiming that "the campaign of gathering signatures will be conducted in the first half of the year."

The issue of early parliamentary elections was also mentioned at the speaker's platform in the Assembly, during the debate on the reconstruction of the Government, which gave the entire idea a different dimension. The Liberals also asked for early elections, as a fair way of clearing up the relations with the Alliance and the situation on a political plan, which has developed following its break up. It was heard from the platform that "the LP parliamentary group has already placed its signatures for early elections." In the parliamentary debate, the Liberals were joined by the PDPA [Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians] MPs.

According to some estimates, the gathering of 150,000 signatures will cost between 2 and 3 million German marks. A large amount, in any event, so it doesn't come as a wonder that it is insisted on clearing up all the moments connected with the resignation. But, only that material aspect isn't in question here. The stakes of the parties are much more important here. Their further establishment on the political scene in the Republic will also depend on the outcome of the initiative.

The picture given by the existing procedural norms is quite undefined. Except for the constitutional decrees there isn't even a minimal framework for implementing the procedure.

The first ambiguity in the procedure comes up at the start—the gathering of 150,000 citizens' signatures. For instance, where those signatures will be placed, how and who will identify them, are questions that are normatively not defined anywhere. It isn't even known what the procedural path of the initiative will be like, when the gathered signatures will be submitted in the Assembly. Will they have to be verified and submitted to the Assembly, and by whom, or will they go directly in front of the MPs?

Presuming this campaign with the gathering of signatures passes, the second one follows which is also full of technical unclarities. The Constitution says "the Assembly is obliged to issue notice of a referendum if one is proposed by at least 150,000 voters." The decree is clear, but it is not expounded further in any other act, so, for instance, it is not known within which period of time this imperativeness must be fulfilled and implemented. This vacuum is present also in terms of the defining of the referendum question, how it will be formulated and specified.

There is a normative gap also in terms of the regulation of the deadline when the scheduling of early elections should start, if the results of the referendum call for that, or, for instance, in which time span another referendum over the same question can be scheduled? There is a Law on Referendum, however, it dates back from the time of the one-party system. Its approach is much too narrow in order to correspond to the new times. In parallel with this, the election regulative is a handicap. As it is known, since the adoption of the Constitution and onwards, the need to pass new election laws is constantly being stressed. However, they have still not been passed, which doesn't suit the proposers.

Certain scientific circles feel that "although this technical vacuum" implies restriction, still, the initiatives, even this one for early elections, can be conducted with a direct implementation of the Constitution. It clearly states-the signatures of 150,000 voters. There are electoral lists for the voters, election committees, electoral municipal committees, which the Assembly can activate. The Constitution gives two main conditions for referendum: At least half of the total number of voters must vote and more than half of them must vote "for," in order for the result of the referendum to be considered positive. The technique can be finalized in a democratic and civilizational way, in the absence of a law, through the active engagement of the Assembly and its communication with the proposer of the initiative, foremost, in regard to the formation of the question.

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Poland: 'Discussion Paper' Prepared for NATO Consultations

WS0603155496 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish 6 Mar 96 p 3

[Article by Wojciech Luczak: "It Is Up to NATO To Decide Whether We Should Abandon Our Defense System; Theses for Dialogue With the Alliance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Consultations to be held by the Polish delegation with NATO representatives are to pertain to, among other things, our strategic defense concept, the future of European security structures, and the alliance's relations with Russia.*

A Polish document containing suggested topics for discussion with the alliance ("discussion paper"), which is to be presented during the first round of consultations between 16 NATO ambassadors and the Polish delegation, is to consist of two parts—political and military.

The most interesting military topic to be taken up in the dialogue will be a presentation of the Polish defense doctrine. The scheme is simple and logical: We have developed an autonomous defense system for Poland, which we can abandon or adapt certain parts of to meet NATO requirements once we have received a formal promise that our country will be admitted to the alliance's defense structures.

We want to demonstrate that, from the military point of view, we are credible and tested partners for the alliance because we declared a readiness to deploy our battalion to support the NATO peacekeeping forces in the preliminary stages of the cooperation project [not further expanded]. When the time came, we fulfilled that promise immediately by sending a battalion to Bosnia. It has been acclaimed for its high performance.

We also wish to discuss and set right the issue of the allegedly huge price the Western taxpayer would have to pay for Poland's membership in NATO. It does not seem we will have any major defense operations in Europe reminiscent of the Cold War period, which would require substantial reform of the military infrastructure in Poland—modernizing airports, bases, ports, or the communications network.

As for politics, we wish to talk about the future shape of European security structures, in which NATO would play a dominant role, and future relations between the alliance and Russia.

The "discussion paper" or the list of topics has to be approved by Brussels before the consultations, scheduled for April, are formally launched.

Poland: Interior, Defense Ministers To Visit Moscow

WS0603144296 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish 6 Mar 96 p 1

[Article by Wojciech Luczak: "Siemiatkowski and Dobrzanski Are Going to Moscow; Two Visits"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As we learned from a very well informed source, President Aleksander Kwasniewski's visit to Moscow (10-11 April) will be preceded by two visits paid by the heads of key presidential ministries.

Interior Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski will visit the Russian capital at the end of March and Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski at the beginning of April.

One of the topics of talks to be held by Siemiatkowski is cooperation with the Russians in the field of combating organized crime. (A plenipotentiary of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, who is an expert on economic crimes and ranked as a colonel, resides in Warsaw and is delegated to cooperate with the Polish police.)

It is possible that Dobrzanski might sign the widely publicized agreement on technological cooperation with Russia, which has been negotiated for quite some time now. It would enable us to purchase spare parts for equipment used by the Armed Forces and give our arms industry access to post-Soviet markets. Jan Czaja, deputy minister of foreign economic cooperation, is responsible for the agreement. According to our sources, it will solve, among other things, the problem of the production of a Polish replica of the Igla Soviet antiaircraft missile (known in Poland as "Grom") and its possible export.

Poland: Spokesman Describes Oleksy Espionage Investigation

LD0603141296 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1105 GMT 6 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Colonel Wlodzimierz Pospiech, the press spokesman of the Warsaw military district prosecutor's office, has said that the investigations launched on 24 January of this year by the military prosecutor's office into the alleged cooperation between [former] Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy and a foreign intelligence service will most probably be completed by 20 April—in other words, within the statutory deadline. The material obtained from the State Protection Office [UOP] still cannot be said to provide full evidence.

[Correspondent Elzbieta Lukowska] Colonel Pospiech said that right now the prosecutor's office is questioning further witnesses—among others, people who had

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previously been abroad and could not be reached. UOP has also handed over recorded cassettes and documents. However, they have still not been processed in a way that would provide evidence. They will not become evidence until the prosecutor's office has questioned all people who collected operational material and the recorded and written material has been checked.

Wlodzimierz Pospiech stressed that the point of conducting the investigation is to establish whether a crime of espionage was committed. So far, the prosecutor's office has not made any final decisions. Apart from trying to determine whether Prime Minister Oleksy was a spy, the prosecutor's office is examining the case of two officers of the Russian intelligence service—Alganov and Yakimishin—who were resident in Poland and who controlled an agent with the pseudonym "Olin." But, as Colonel Pospiech said, it would be very difficult to sentence citizens of Russia, should their guilt be proved. There have been cases, however, of secret service officers being sentenced in their absence for spying in foreign states.

Poland: Army Restructuring, Consequences Viewed

WS0503155296 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 2 Mar 96 pp 3-4, 6-7

[Article by Marek Henzler: "All Power Into the Hands of MON? Squaring the Four-Cornered Cap"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"There is no political war going on at the top between the civilian Ministry of National Defense [MON] and the General Staff [SG]," says new Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski. "We are not a witches' Sabbath," says Deputy Minister Andrzej Karkoszka, head of the team for MON restructuring, trying to reassure the concerned military. Many officers from the SG do not believe these opinions. In their view, what the civilians are doing is demolishing the highest structures of the Armed Forces, which is dangerous for the state, and creating new ones—resembling the times of the Polish People's Republic [PRL].*

After a few years of legislative wrestling, a new law on the Office of the Minister of National Defense took effect on 14 February. Lech Walesa, shortly before leaving the Namiestnikowski Palace [presidential residence], lodged a complaint against this law with the Constitutional Tribunal. However, before the Tribunal looked into the complaint, President Aleksander Kwasniewski had withdrawn it. With this, the question of placing the SG of the Polish Armed Forces was a foregone conclusion: It is now part of the MON structure.

Directorate of Supported Knee-Bending

Thus far, the SG has been the central commanding body of the Armed Forces and a selected part of the defense sector. It used to be run by the SG chief, appointed by the president of the Polish Republic in agreement with the defense minister. The SG chief is the highest ranking soldier. The SG (that is, a group of central military institutions), the ground forces, including—although they had their own, selected commanding staffs—the Navy, the Air Force, and the Air Defense, were subordinate to him. The defense minister had an influence on what was going on in the Armed Forces virtually only through the SG chief, who, by virtue of his rank, had a strong position not only in defense structures.

Currently, the SG chief is "directly subordinate" to the defense minister and "commands on behalf of the minister" of the Armed Forces during peacetime. It is just the practical meaning of the word "commands" that the dispute is about between the directorate of the SG and MON. In the SG's view, one cannot command in an appropriate way, even in peacetime, if one lacks authorization concerning financial, personnel, and disciplinary decisions, as well as the possibilities of controlling subordinates. Today, this authorization is being taken over by the ministry. Civilian politicians are incapacitating higher rank commanders and forming the structures of MON, which, to the officers, bring memories of the Ministry of Defense from the Jaruzelski or Florian-Siwicki minister-general times.

The new directorate of the defense sector does not come to terms with these charges. In their opinion, quite a long period of taking civilian and democratic control over the Armed Forces is drawing to a close at last. We are adapting to the standards binding in Western democracies. Moreover, without establishing such control, Poland cannot count on accession to NATO.

"Civilian politicians are looking at us as if we were South American captains or African sergeants," I learned at the SG. "In Europe, the military does not make revolutions. Politicians can be multiplying controlling bodies, if they wish, but let them not deprive us of the tools of command and form a new Main Political Directorate [GZP]..."

Despite many organizational changes, the SG has remained a bureaucratic giant. Almost 1,800 people work there, 400 more than at MON. The horizontal structure of the SG is formed by 30 directorates, chief offices, and departments. The majority of them are 20, 30-man sections, with generals or colonels holding general posts at the head. Such a structure is extremely costly.

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At the SG, there are important directorates of typically military tasks, such as operational and strategic, mobilization and recruiting, territorial defense, and military infrastructure. But there are also directorates of physical fitness and cartography. Moreover, many sections of the SG, to a great extent, double the work of similar bodies within MON—most of all, those that deal with Army finances, administration and legislation, education and educational activities, personnel, and control. "With counting socks," as evil tongues are saying.

SG employees themselves admit that one should change a lot here, but after consulting with the SG chief. And the new minister has not done that, liquidating the economic and financial directorate of the SG with his arbitrary decisions.

Strength of Personality

Janusz Onyszkiewicz, one of the eight former heads of MON during the past six years, is of the opinion that "Dobrzanski has been a man from the shadows until now." At the same time, Onyszkiewicz was the only deputy who voted against Dobrzanski's candidacy in the Sejm National Defense Committee. He is doubtful whether the new minister has sufficient knowledge to get acquainted with the complex mechanisms of MON.

After his official appointment, Dobrzanski announced that the shortcomings in the legal system of defense would be made up for with "the strength of his personality." Asked by POLSKA ZBROJNA what factors were decisive for his elevation, politics (he is a member of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]) or professionalism, Dobrzanski replied: "Surely both. My military experience has been accumulating throughout the whole period of my work."

The minister worked in youth organizations, was a deputy director of the National Library, and managed a bank branch, but the biggest accumulation of experience took place at the Ministry of Culture. Being responsible for the budget of the sector, he cooperated closely with the defense department. The minister learned the problems of the Armed Forces particularly "broadly and profoundly" during his two-year term as a secretary in the Defense Affairs Committee at the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM], the post he had been appointed to by Prime Minister Pawlak. "I cannot behave like a chicken now because the milieu has recognized that I am fully qualified to accomplish the mission at that post."

Stanislaw Dobrzanski believes that today the key to the NATO door should be looked for not abroad but in the country. This "key" is the regulations that enable the skillful administration of the state defense complex, both the new and old ones, but enforced at last. "Full, democratic control over the armed forces," augurs the new head of the sector, "requires unconditional subordination of the SG of the Polish Armed Forces to the civilian minister of national defense." The minister is going to look after the Polish economy because the budget of the Armed Forces will depend on its shape. He has revealed that a Political and Strategic Plan of the Polish Republic Defense is being prepared.

"From those working within the range of my responsibilities, I will not be expecting complaints about Polish equipment," he announced. "Even if the equipment is not perfect, one needs to say it in the privacy of offices. Only there can it be sized up."

In the privacy of offices one can size up the minister, too. "Behind closed doors, during consultative meetings with me, the military has the right to criticize me as well as my associates and my actions. This is obvious. But I regard it to be inadmissible to criticize in public, and I will endeavor to eliminate such cases if they happen!" said the minister during the hearings in the Sejm.

"An URM official wants to make himself credible and is showing how strong he is today," sums up a chief of an SG directorate. Similarly to other people from the SG with whom I spoke, he would not reveal his name or function. He does not want to be the first "eliminated" general.

Witches' Sabbath

The so-called Karkoszka Committee (its deputy chairman is General Jaroslaw Bielecki of the SG) is to draft a new statute of regulations of the ministry and the project of the Council of Ministers' administrative order about the authorities, the scope of responsibilities, and the MON structure. The Committee lacks decision powers, yet some SG officers believe that, although it has not completed its work, Minister Dobrzanski is already partitioning the SG.

"I will put it bluntly," comments Deputy Minister Andrzej Karkoszka in POLSKA ZBROJNA. "He who says so, stirs up confusion."

In the generals' view, in the SG a financial section should remain, even if it is only responsible for financing war preparations. They do not understand why the minister is in such a hurry. Why did he liquidate the financial directorate in the SG? Was it because he paid less attention to the division of the MON Finance Department, made a few days later, into the Economic-Financial Department and the Budget Policy Department, which definitely enlarged the MON structures. Besides, there is also talk of the necessity of setting up a team to administer defense resources.

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Is MON's Finance Department snowballing because one needs to justify the establishment of the position of under secretary of state for finance, filled by the former director of the Finance Department?

The new minister has also set up a new section for socioparliamentary affairs. Some suspect that, by doing this, the restitution of the former GZP [Main Political Directorate] is imminent. Why? Because one of the jobs of the new under secretary is to control the circulation of information system on moods and discipline in the sector's units.

Thus far, there have been a department of education at MON and an educational directorate at the SG. The committee has not yet settled the question of what will become of it, but the officers indicate that ceding all of its functions to the sector may side with making the Armed Forces political again. Perhaps, again, one will have to write the so-called notorious reports on moods, which were discontinued after the dissolution of political sections in the Armed Forces. If they return, they will immediately find their way to the civilian officials' desks at MON, on whom inspections of the units, personnel policy—that is, promotions—will depend.

"We finally wanted to break with politics, but it is coming back. Again, there will be a list of preferred periodicals for soldier club rooms and books written by 'new Dobraczynskis,' [Dobraczynski—a writer who supported the official PRL policy line] recommended by order of a superior authority to military libraries," I hear at the SG.

Are the generals' fears of another phase in the many year process of alternatively making the Armed Forces political and apolitical justified? In a way, they are. Politicians representing different political options have come through the whole of the civilian sector, unless I am mistaken. Not all people have cast away their party ID's in the cloakroom, and, by engaging their coworkers, they were not always exclusively directed by their substantial training. SG generals would also like to forget about the great pressure to make the Armed Forces religious, in which, together with the field bishop and Army chaplains, they participated with great and visible enthusiasm until recently.

Servicemen do not want another ideological patron, and they are taking double precautions. They are fed up with the constant mood swings. First, there was the PRL era, when partisanship was rife in the Armed Forces. Then came the era of filling in blank spots, with restoring the historical truth, rejecting old and selecting new patrons. A field diocese was set up, and it was in fashion among the generals to go on pilgrimages. Career soldiers were banned from joining political parties, but, on the other hand, various political powers flirted with the Armed Forces. Some of the military, even generals, wished to become deputies and senators, mostly from the pro-Walesa Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR] lists. Out of more than 20 officers running in the parliamentary elections in 1993, only one (from the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] list) became a member of parliament. The Polish electorate wants the Armed Forces apolitical and confined to the barracks.

There Is No Definition

The Karkoszka Committee assumes that our less than a quarter of a million Armed Forces and the remaining part of the state defense sector will serve the needs of the Defense Ministry, which is split into five basic sections. Apart from the earlier mentioned socioparliamentary and financial ones, there will be sections of defense policy, logistics, and command. Associations with the PRL come to life when one thinks of the appointment of five or six deputy ministers-generals who used to manage the GZP, the SG, and called themselves the chief logistics officers of the Polish Armed Forces [GKWP] or the Chief Inspectorate of Technical Engineering [GIT], catering to the needs of the almost half a million strong Army.

Currently, a completely new section of Army command, based on the deeply-transformed SG, is to be established within the MON structure. There is also talk of having, apart from the already existing commands of the Navy, the Air Force, and the national Air Defense Forces, a separate command for the land armies. The current tasks of the SG will also be split. The SG will retain typical staff functions such as planning, issues related to mobilization, development of military technologies, and supervision of training, whereas command over military units will move down to the ground forces command.

General Wilecki is not concealing the fact that he opposes the idea, which is undoubtedly inspired by U.S. standards and not faithfully copied by other NATO member nations. He does so not because it will limit his current power—he has often said that he was not "welded to the post." Nonetheless, he believes that, in Poland, in its geomilitary position—after the Army restructuring has been completed and when the Navy totals about 5,000-7,000 men, the Air Force about 42,000, and the ground forces about 130,000—it is no use establishing for the latter a separate structure of command. Never will Poland's Navy or Air Force conduct war operations on its own. They will always cooperate and supplement ground forces operations. Thus, the command over the ground forces should continue to be under the SG.

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"Why do we need two commands for the Warsaw garrison? Those for the ground forces and for the Warsaw Military District?" asks Gen. Wilecki. "Unless we disband military districts, as some civilians hint. But, then, why did they tell us not long ago to set up the fourth Krakow district? We lack clear definitions of what democratic, civilian control over armed forces means. To me, it also means bearing responsibility."

Minister Dobrzanski has announced that the number of jobs at the SG and MON will decrease by 25 percent. Deputy Minister Karkoszka is a little more moderate in this respect because he is aware of various new needs. In the defense policy section, which is subordinate to him, a new 36-person department of integration with NATO is being established. Not long ago, Poland signed a treaty on open skies. We must set up a section that will organize inspections and analyze aerial photos. A similar situation exists with the convention on the liquidation of chemical weapons. One needs to create a service of drawing up MON's budget in line with NATO standards. Today, we do not even know what assets the ministry has. Moreover, one needs to set up a service responsible for the standardization of administration, command, training, education, and military technical engineering. A few thousand NATO regulations are in force in these areas. Someone has to introduce this mountain of paper to the Polish Armed Forces.

"Civilian officials would also like to control how straight a single soldier fires a shot"—this is how ideas that the military training inspection be a component of MON's Control Department are commented on at the SG. The minister is now responsible for personnel policy. But isn't it absurd that, for instance, a brigade commander will not be able to transfer an ensign from one regiment to another in a different town without the ministry's consent? An opinion is heard at the SG that the minister's personnel decisions should pertain to higher-rank officers—that is, colonels and generals. The minister has a lot of work, anyway, because it is to him exclusively that the Military Information Services, the Academy of National Defense, control, and probably in the future the Law Department are subordinated.

According to staff officers, there is a clear-cut tendency to interpret often abstruse articles of the law exclusively to the advantage of the civilians from MON. Besides, is it really a civilian sector when 800 uniformed people and only 650 100-percent proof civilians work there?

"After the charges of spying for Russia that have been brought against Oleksy and a controversial assessment of the Polish Armed Forces condition embraced in the report to the U.S. Congress, the coalition, with its expeditious 'making the Army civilian,' wants to make itself more credible with the future partners from NATO." This kind of opinion is also heard at the SG. "Will they really want us if we are not only growingly poorly equipped but also disarmed by internal disputes? It is better when politicians finally determine the role and place of the Armed Forces in the new constitution so that the work on bills on military responsibilities, state of war, martial law, using the military in extreme emergencies, and new disciplinary regulation can get off the ground."

Whom the Armed Forces Serve

Since 1990, over 20 civilian ministers and under secretaries of state, representing various political persuasions, have come through the defense sector. SG officers harbor the following doubts: "With this kind of rotation, should we show them everything—command headquarters that allow them to mutually monitor different armies from the air, the most classified mobilization and defense plans—and put every classified document on their desks?"

Asked if the incumbent SG chief will step down, Minister Dobrzanski said that, for the time being, he was not considering it.

"Whether Wilecki is 'eliminated' in a month or in two years, he has his place in the history of the Polish Armed Forces, anyway," says one of his subordinates from the SG. "Today, we will surely pay for his having been so close to Walesa and, which was his mistake, having ignored the deputies during last year's Sejm debate on defense. Some of us are dyspeptic after the 'Drawsko dinner.' Even when Wilecki goes, the confusion in the Armed Forces will remain."

"In the Polish Armed Forces, soldiers have always started marching with the left foot. Do civilian politicians want to teach us how to march with the right foot?" asked Gen. Wilecki in Minsk, after the ceremony of incorporating 10 MiG-29's, exchanged with the Czechs for 11 Sokol helicopters, into the first fighter regiment, Warszawa.

"The impoverished fatherland could give you only this," Wilecki said to airmen from the reportedly elite regiment that welcomed their highest ranking military commander and the accompanying field bishop with the banner that read "We Serve Our Fatherland—The Polish People's Republic."

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Poland: Privatization Results in 1995 Outlined

WS0603133996 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 5 Mar 96 p 20

[Article by Pawel Florkiewicz: "Ownership Transformation Dynamics in 1995; Direct Privatization Prevails"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Out of the total number of 8,441 state-owned companies that existed in 1990, as many as 3,465 were privatized by the end of December 1995. Many of them were liquidated for economic reasons—nearly 40 percent. Liquidation for the purpose of privatization was applied in the case of 33.2 percent of the companies.*

As far as capital privatization is concerned, last year 30 sales took place. The most profitable transaction was the sale of Stomil Olsztyn (approximately 280.2 million zlotys—Z), Debica SA (approximately Z132.2 million), and Winiary SA (Z178.1 million), reads the latest quarterly DYNAMIKA PRZEKSZTALCEN WLASNOSCIOWYCH [OWNERSHIP TRANSFORMATIONS DYNAMICS], published by the Privatization Ministry. Among single-proprietor Treasury-owned companies, companies that were privatized by means of the capital method constituted 16.7 percent of the total number of these companies.

The revenues that the budget obtained from capital privatization in 1995 are estimated at approximately Z1.7 billion. They exceeded the revenues that were projected in the Budget Law by approximately 20 percent. This year's revenues from this type of privatization are projected to amount to Z1.8 billion.

Direct privatization also proved effective. It was carried out by means of several methods. Until the end of 1995, 215 companies were offered for sale (share in direct privatization—18.8 percent). Another method—contribution of a company to a new company (the least popular technique)—was used in the case of 65 companies (6.4 percent of all of the companies privatized by means of the direct method).

The most popular method is still leasing by employees. The method consists of giving a company's assets to its employees, who pay a certain amount of money for this privilege. Until the end of 1995, this method was employed in 788 companies, or 68.6 percent of companies privatized by means of the direct method.

As far as liquidation of companies due to their poor economic condition is concerned, until the end of December 1995 as many as 1,358 liquidation processes were initiated, and 396 firms were crossed off the register of state-owned companies. Bankruptcy proceedings were instituted in more than 32 percent of the companies where the liquidation process was under way.

An important place in last year's ownership transformations was also occupied by bank settlement proceedings. In 1995 the restructuring of indebted companies encompassed 54 state-owned firms.

At the end of last year, the number of valid bank settlements submitted in the Privatization Ministry amounted to 149 (at the end of 1994, 97). There were 86 settlements that included the condition of commercialization (in 1994, 68), and there were 90 settlements that included the decision that debts must be converted into shares (at the end of 1994, 60).

Last year the National Investment Funds [NFI] program was launched. The distribution of the shareholders' certificates began in November; in the same month, the process of contributing the shares of the companies participating in the program to the individual NFI's also began.

If we look at the branches of the national economy, we will find that the leading sector in the NFI program is industry (417 companies), followed by construction (69) and trade (15).

This year the process will be continued. There are also plans to start selling NFI shares on the stock market.

As far as the various regions are concerned, the leading voivodship in the ownership transformations is Katowice, where various privatization methods were applied in 314 companies. Second comes the Warsaw Voivodship, with 214 such companies, and third Poznan Voivodship (165 companies).

If we look at the map showing where the various privatization methods were used, we will see that the voivodships where the biggest number of firms were transformed into single-proprietor Treasury-owned companies are Katowice (125) and Warsaw (56). This order was reversed in the case of direct privatization, where Warsaw Voivodship was the leader (98 companies), followed by Katowice Voivodship (95). Liquidation processes caused by a bad economic condition were most often carried out in companies in Katowice Voivodship (122), Olsztyn Voivodship (78), and Poznan Voivodship (66). These processes were the rarest in Chelm Voivodship (6), Ostroleka Voivodship (7), and Sieradz Voivodship (7).

The most privatized regions are the following voivodships: Przemysl (59.2 percent), Olsztyn (55.7 percent), and Czestochowa (52.9 percent).

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State-Owned Companies Subjected to Ownership Transformation Processes Up to 31 Dec 1995

Process	Number of Companies	Percent
Liquidation	1,358	39.2
Privatization	1,149	33.2
Transformation into single-proprietor Treasury-owned companies	958	27.6

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Romania: Defense Ministers on 'Balkan Axis,' NATO

96P20311A

[FBIS Report] The possible formation of a "Balkan Axis" and the implications of NATO expansion were discussed by Romanian Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca and Bulgarian Defense Minister Dimitar Pavlov at a joint press conference during the latter's visit to Romania on 18-19 January, as reported in the 24-30 January 1996 issue of the Romanian Ministry of National Defense weekly OBSERVATORUL MILITAR.

Tinca said that the idea of forming a "Balkan Axis" arose at a meeting of the Greek, Bulgarian, and Romanian foreign ministers. "It was thought that a similar meeting of defense ministers from the same three Balkan states could be organized." Tinca noted, however, that Romania and Bulgaria decided last year to also include the defense minister of Turkey, beleiving that limiting the meeting to just three countries might have prompted "interpretations and speculations" that would have a "negative effect" in the region. If other Balkan defense ministers "have a positive attitude toward this idea, they can join us," Tinca added. He cautioned that the proposal is "in the suggestion stage" and that "we must see what the reaction is from all defense ministers in the region." "So far," he said, "we know that Romania and Bulgaria support the idea." He explained that the meeting would be without an agenda, giving the four ministers an opportunity to "exchange opinions" on the problems each country is facing and on the general situation in the Balkans. Bulgarian Minister Pavlov added that if such a meeting took place, it would be "our contribution" to the promotion of confidence and security in the region.

Discussing whether the NATO mission in the former Yugoslavia contributes to the process of NATO expansion into Central and East Europe, Pavlov said that the purpose of NATO involvement is only to ensure that the Dayton agreement is implemented and to establish peace in the area. Tinca argued that, in his view, an "explanation" is needed as to what is meant by NATO expansion. One interpretation would be granting formal membership in NATO, he said, while another would be expanding "NATO's function or zone of action," which "certainly has taken place." If one accepts the second interpretation, he said, the participation of nonmembers of NATO—Partnership for Peace countries and Russia—in the peacekeeping operation may indicate that there has been a "certain evolution of the Alliance." While it might be only "speculation," Tinca said, "we can conclude" from Russia's participation that despite its opposition to NATO expansion, Russia "is part of this process."

Regarding bilateral relations, Pavlov said that Romania and Bulgaria—including their armed forces—are in "approximately identical situations," making exchanges of opinions "extremely useful." The two countries must "unify" their efforts regarding military policy, the defense industry, and defense-related research, he asserted. Hailing the bilateral agreement on cooperation in civil defense, which was signed during the visit, Pavlov expressed confidence that the defense industries, the military research institutes, and the repair plants in both countries would carry out the provisions of the agreement.

Responding to a question from a Bulgarian reporter, Pavlov noted that the agreement would allow the two countries to cooperate in the case of natural catastrophes, industrial disasters, and fires, especially in the border zones. Tinca added that assistance would be given only at the request of the country needing it, for as long as the recipient deemed it necessary. He said that a commission of specialists from the two countries would be set up to deal with the effects of earthquakes, floods, and chemical or nuclear accidents.

Romania: Iliescu Views U.S. Statement on 'Extremists'

AU0503181596 Bucharest ZIUA in Romanian 29 Feb 96 p 1

[Article by A.M.: "Ion Iliescu Joins the PUNR and the PDSR in Blaming the U.S. Ambassador"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In a statement made yesterday to the Mediafax news agency, President Ion Iliescu said that it would be better if Alfred Moses, the U.S. ambassador in Bucharest, "would refrain" from making declarations regarding the presence of extremist parties in the Romanian Government, as the definition of extremism is a debatable one.

Last week in Cluj, Ambassador Moses had stated that if a government could be set up after the elections that would not include any extremists, this would serve the cause of Romania's joining NATO. President Iliescu added that there are extremists in every segment of the Romanian political spectrum. The PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] leaders also reacted to the statement made by the U.S. ambassador, saying that they would complain to President Bill Clinton about the ambassador's stance. Adrian Nastase, the executive president of the PDSR, assessed that Alfred Moses' statement exceeds his mandate as ambassador and hinted at the fact that it could be considered interference in Romania's internal affairs.

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Also yesterday, MAE [Romanian Foreign Affairs Ministry] spokesman Sorin Ducaru said that the statement by the U.S. ambassador represents "a commonsense assessment" and does not exceed the limits of diplomatic usance.

Romania: PSM's Paunescu Views Chances of Election

AU0503180896 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 29 Feb 96 p 5

[Interview with PSM Vice President Adrian Paunescu by Mirela Soare; place and date not given: "The PSM Candidate for the Presidency, Poet Adrian Paunescu, Says: 'My Most Dangerous Adversary Is Ion Iliescu'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Soare] Mr. Adrian Paunescu, in your opinion, what are your chances compared to those of the other presidential candidates?

[Paunescu] They are by far greater than those of the others. I am deeply touched and thankful to my colleagues not just for the fact they have put trust in me, but also for the way in which they did it. My designation honors and obliges me at the same time.

[Soare] Do you not think that two presidential candidates on behalf of the National Bloc [consisting of the Socialist Party of Labor and the Greater Romania Party] are too many?

[Paunescu] We are the PSM [Socialist Party of Labor].

[Soare] Mr. Paunescu, who do you think is your most dangerous adversary in the race for the Cotroceni Palace [presidential headquarters]?

[Paunescu] I think it is the current president of the country, Ion Iliescu. I will begin the battle for Cotroceni by rendering homage to Ion Iliescu for all the good things he has done during all this years in office. Unlike him, who began to write after he came to power, I myself started by writing first. I wish Mr. Iliescu a great deal of success in his literary career.

[Soare] Could you mention three arguments with which you believe you will be able to defeat Ion Iliescu?

[Paunescu] The first one is the program of the party that designated me to run, and one should not overlook the wish for renewal throughout the nation. And no one should forget that I am not an easily handled adversary. It will be a long and chaotic struggle, but you can count on me. In this electoral battle there is but one risk for me, namely that I may win.

Romania: PSM Choice of Paunescu for Presidency Viewed

AU2902152596 Bucharest ZIUA in Romanian 26 Feb 96 p 5

[Article by Mihai Toader: "Senator Adrian Paunescu Named Candidate for Cotroceni"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Paunescu Says He Will Rebuild National Reconciliation

Last Saturday, the National Conference of the Socialist Party of Labor [PSM] unanimously elected Senator Adrian Paunescu as candidate for the presidential elections this year. Paunescu's candidacy was established at the National Committee's plenary session, which took place behind closed doors last week. PSM leader Ilie Verdet said that he would not compete for the Cotroceni [presidential] palace, for the sake of the party's prosperity.

In his speech, which he prepared one day before his official election, Adrian Paunescu swore twice that he will not betray the trust put into him by the PSM delegates and that the Romanian people will be the reference point in all his activity. Likewise, he reviewed the tragic destiny of the nation's prominent figures during the course of history and promised that, when the PSM came to power, acts of political revenge would cease. The PSM candidate said that his election campaign would be at an ethically high level. "We will not slander the other candidates, because we must compete in an honest manner. Political rivals are threatening each other with imprisonment; we will rebuild national reconciliation," Paunescu said.

Ilie Verdet Convinced That Elections Will Bring Left to Power

Opening the PSM National Conference proceedings, party president Ilie Verdet made a political analysis of the PSM's electoral strategy. He said that his party will emerge victorious, because the electorate will vote for the left. As a matter of fact, the leadership of the socialists claims that in the six years since the revolution, the consistent leftist forces have managed to convince the Romanian electorate. Verdet is convinced that Romania will be no exception to the general trend that has brought the left back to power in most of the countries of the former Soviet bloc. In this respect, he suggested that all leftist political groupings contesting the elections should conclude a nonaggression and mutual support pact. Nevertheless, the socialist leader claims that his party is one of the most influential political forces, capable of ensuring the country's governing either alone

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or together with other parties. In Verdet's opinion, the only way to come out of the economic crisis is to choose the socialist path. On the other hand, he said that he is not against privatization, but that he rejects the current reform, which draws its inspiration from wild capitalism.

PSM Has Great Plans for Industry

The PSM leadership announced that it plans to implement an economic program to combat unemployment. It also intends to initiate the privatization of part of the state-owned property and to develop industry, which will enjoy government's support. "Renouncing industrialization is an erroneous process, imposed by the current rulers. The PSM is ready to ally itself with other parties in order to implement this program," Verdet said. Likewise, the socialist leader suggested the creation of a state body for planning and reform, which should not have only consultative powers.

Socialists' Electoral Promises as Bait

The PSM's electoral platform, adopted by the National Conference plenary session, provides for the creation of 600,000 new jobs and 300,000 housing units in the next four years. The document also stipulates the reintroduction of 10-year compulsory schooling, free of charge. Likewise, it provides for an average salary of $200 and a medium pension of at least 70 percent of the reference real salary.

With this program, Verdet's socialists hope to win over the hearts of the voters, forgetting to mention the financial means with which they intend to implement their program. Moreover, the PSM is against accepting foreign loans, since it claims that the Western help cannot take the country out of its crisis.

Romania: Bacanu Elected Civic Alliance President

AU2902135396 Bucharest ZIUA in Romanian 26 Feb 96 p 5

[Article by Irina Stanescu: "Civic Alliance Congress Elects P.M. Bacanu as President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The fourth congress of the Civic Alliance [AC] of Romania, the proceedings of which were held over 24-25 February in Bucharest, elected Petre Mihai Bacanu as its new president. The vice presidents are: Romulus Rusan, Ana Blandiana, Valerian Stan, Nicolae Prelipceanu, and Gheorghe Ceausescu.

In his message addressed to the congress, Senator Constantin Ticu Dumitrescu, the president of the AFDPR [Association of Former Political Prisoners of Romania], insisted on stating that "whether a KGB hand or not, whether a traitor or not, Ion Iliescu is still a curse and a burden for our country."

During the proceedings of the congress they issued a declaration "Against the Political Manipulation of National Pride." The alliance protests the manipulation by the current rulers of the country of the national consciousness and the history of the Romanian people, as well as the process of denationalization of the ethnic Romanians living in Bessarabia, northern Bucovina, and the Herta district [currently in Ukraine]. In the same document the alliance addressed an appeal to all political parties to refrain from "demagogic and jingoistic discourses that could depreciate the notion of loving one's homeland." The AC decided to oust the former [Romanian Communist] party activists from among its members. Furthermore, the congress decided to turn to the Nobel Prize Nomination Committee, asking for Ilie Ilascu [Moldovan citizen held in prison by the authorities of the self-styled Dniester Republic] to be awarded the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize.

The AC congress passed a motion condemning the abuses perpetrated by the current rulers of the country. The document expresses the AC's determination to bring the Romanian national television company to court. The latter is accused of illegal functioning, as it lacks both the necessary leadership and control bodies, as well as a body especially empowered to account in front of public opinion for the way in which the company carries out its duties.

At the conclusion of the proceedings the delegates sang the Hooligans' Anthem [Imnul Golanilor—a song evoking the Bucharest students' street protests during the summer of 1990], whereby they all rose to their feet when they reached the passage saying "much rather dead than a Communist."

Romania: Constantinescu on No-Confidence Motion

AU0503185896 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 28 Feb 96 p 3

[Unattributed report on statements by CDR President Emil Constantinescu: "We Can No Longer Accept a Political System in Which the Guilty People in the Government Become Either Ambassadors or Presidential Counselors"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday (Monday 26 February 1996—editor's note), a motion obtained the majority of the deputies' votes in the Chamber of Deputies. I am pleased that, at the end of four years of parliamentary struggle against incompetence and corruption, this political victory is the result of an initiative advanced by the CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania]. Even

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more important is the fact that this initiative came after demands by big trade unions and a large number of citizens whose rights have been violated by the irresponsible policy of the current government. Currently, given the fact that we are talking about a simple motion, everybody is asking what is going to happen. The government will not fall. So, what is the use of this motion? How will the everyday life of the Romanian citizens be turned for the better? These are questions which I, as representative of the initiators of this motion, feel compelled to answer.

For the first time in the constitutional history of Romania, a government is legally placed vis-a-vis its own inability to rule. For the first time, after the miners' incursion, after the innumerable investigation commissions, and after the innumerable disclosures in the press, the Romanian dignitaries must answer for their deeds. We have asked two things through the motion: a correct evaluation of the damage caused by the energy crisis and an investigation to establish clearly and precisely who the guilty people are, from an administrative, material, and penal viewpoint. Today, this motion and these demands are not only ours. Through the Chamber of Deputies they have acquired a legal character and an obligatory character. I wish to assure you that we will watch out so that what has happened so far in the investigations in this country should no longer happen. We are the initiators of this motion and we will see to it that things are brought to a satisfactory conclusion. We can no longer accept a political system in which the guilty people in the government become either ambassadors or presidential counselors. This time, those affected by closed enterprises, the families compelled to live in cold, and the people who became unemployed due to lack of electric power must know that there are people guilty of causing this damage and suffering.

I hope that the victory of this energy motion will represent for Romania the beginning of an era in which each person will have to answer correctly for his deeds.

Romania: SRI Accused of 'Illegal Dealings'

AU0503163696 Bucharest ZIUA in Romanian 28 Feb 96 p 1

[Article by George Proca: "The Columna Bank Is the Money Box of the SRI"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The latest issue of weekly LUMEA LIBERA carries an interview with a former Securitate officer, who reveals sensational things about the Columna bank. The former counterintelligence employee claims that "the Columna bank is the bank of the SRI" [Romanian Intelligence Service]. As this is a safe haven for the secret services, Virgil Magureanu, the director of the SRI, has deposited "millions of dollars and billions of lei" here. The officer also claims that the aforementioned bank holds business ties with covert SRI companies, as well as fictitious companies, which allow for illegal dealings. Thus, via the latter companies they are engaged in export operations, mainly to the Russian Federation and Ukraine, but also to the Middle East.

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Federal

FRY: Croatian Envoy Discusses Steps Toward Recognition

AU0503130796 Zagreb NACIONAL in Serbo-Croatian 1 Mar 96 pp 12-13

[Interview with Veljko Knezevic, chief of the Bureau of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Zagreb, by Igor Kolovrat in Zagreb; date not given: "Before Mutual Recognition of Croatia and Serbia, the Problem of Cape Prevlaka Has To Be Solved as Agreed and Signed in Dayton!"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *The more and more frequent meetings and negotiations between Croatia and Serbia on the normalization of relations between the two states were the subject of our interview with Veljko Knezevic, chief of the Bureau of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] in Zagreb.* [passage omitted]

Very well informed, Knezevic was born in a village near Knin. He spent the whole period of his service in Croatia, and the last days at work as the general manager of Croatian Television. He remained there until the first multiparty elections, and then moved to Serbia. He then once again returned to Croatia to perform his present duty, which many interpreted as a slap to Croatian policy.

[Kolovrat] How influential are the more and more frequent meetings between the leading Serbian and Croatian companies regarding the process of normalization of relations of Croatia and FRY? Do you think that, given the "still hot gun muzzles," these meetings are premature, or should they be even more frequent and productive?

[Knezevic] The meetings, as you say, of the leading Serbian and Croatian companies are the result of the course of normalization between the FRY and Republic of Croatia so far. A constituent part of the normalization is also the establishment of telephone lines, complete postal and telecommunications cooperation, the establishment of railroad and road traffic (opening up the Zagreb-Belgrade highway), the mutual use of the Adriatic oil-pipeline, establishment of the air traffic and opening of the civil aviation corridors above our territories, which are so intertwined that first of all the FRY and Croatia have to reach agreement over the international air corridor.

Serb Nation Has Right To Return

[Passage omitted] [Kolovrat] Have you had an opportunity so far to visit the area of former so-called RSK [Republic of Serb Krajina]? Do you have any information about the approximate number of the Serbs who fled that area after "Operation Storm" and who want to return to their homes?

[Knezevic] Most of the Serb refugees from "Krajina" want to return to their homes, estates, and apartments. It is natural, and I think that the problem of refugees-displaced persons is so urgent and delicate that all sides are facing a historical and humanitarian test. I believe that we will find both strength and the means to pass that test in the interest of human rights. [passage omitted]

[Kolovrat] When did you meet President Tudjman last and what did you talk about?

[Knezevic] The last time we met was on the occasion of last year's visit by Minister Vladislav Jovanovic to Zagreb. We talked about the elements of mutual normalization of relations and about the problems that stand in the way of mutual recognition.

[Kolovrat] How much, if at all, have things moved in a positive direction after Minister Granic's visit to Belgrade?

[Knezevic] It was agreed in Belgrade that we should take one step after another toward mutual recognition. In that sense, it was agreed that several practical and concrete agreements had to be prepared: the opening of the superhighway, the establishment of railroad traffic, air traffic, and opening of the air corridor, the Adriatic oil pipeline, the giving of consular authorities to the Bureau of the SFRY [as published—Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia] and to the Office of the Republic of Croatia. All these agreements will be discussed and made at the approaching meeting of Ministers Milutinovic and Granic in Zagreb soon.

[Kolovrat] When should the division of the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] assets take place?

[Knezevic] The division of the armament of the former JNA will probably be dealt with within the framework of the negotiations on succession.

Gradually Toward Mutual Recognition

[Kolovrat] Do you know how many Croatian companies have already opened branch offices in Belgrade? For instance, INA [Croatian Oil Company] and Jugopetrol [Serbian Oil Company] have signed an agreement. Do you know at what stage those agreements and businesses now are?

[Knezevic] The contracts are being elaborated, and everybody has been waiting for the bilateral state agreement. I do not know whether there are any newly opened branch offices. However, we will come to that stage, too.

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[Kolovrat] When do you expect the superhighway and the Zagreb-Belgrade railroad to be opened?

[Knezevic] We will discuss that at the approaching meeting in Zagreb.

[Kolovrat] Why has the mutual recognition of Croatia and the FRY been constantly postponed?

[Knezevic] I have pointed out that both sides had agreed that they should take one step after another, until full mutual recognition. Everything we do, and the preparations for the meeting of the two ministers, is the way toward the recognition. Among other things, the issue of Cape Prevlaka has to be solved before the recognition. Yugoslavia insists upon the Dayton agreement.

[Kolovrat] The Vukovar municipal authorities in exile insist that, upon the disarmament of the paramilitary formations, there should be an immediate establishment of Croatian authority over there, the kuna should be the means of payment, the Croatian school system should be applied, and all the Serbs who had lived there up to 1991 can stay there unless they have committed war crimes, while all the others who moved there later must leave.

Is it not logical to establish Croatian authorities there, since it is legally and internationally recognized Croatian territory?

[Knezevic] Your question touches the subject that requires that we stick to the letter and spirit of the document known as "The Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem." The Yugoslav side insists that the agreement is read and interpreted as a whole and that it is not good to have unilateral understanding and insistence on priorities and practical moves. The sides who have signed it are the Croatian and Serbian side, which represents the Serbs from this region: On this occasion, I only remind you of some parts of the agreement that are often overlooked in the general public.

Article 1 clearly says that the transitional period lasts 12 months, "which can be prolonged for at the most one more period of the same duration, if one of the sides so demand." So, there is enough time for a complete and honest implementation of the agreement.

On demilitarization, the agreement says literally: "The region will be demilitarized according to the schedule and procedures determined by the international forces. This demilitarization will be carried out within 30 days of the deployment of the international forces and will comprise all military forces, weapons, and the police, except for the international forces and the police the activity of which is under auspices of, or approved by the Transitional Administration." Article 7 is also very important, and it says that "all persons have the right to return freely to their residences in the region and to live there in safe conditions. All the persons who have left the region or come to the region, and who previously had had permanent residence in the Republic of Croatia, have a right to live in the region." The term "region" refers to Baranja, eastern Slavonia, and western Srijem.

Article 12 is also particularly significant. It says that the Transitional Administration is due to organize elections for all the organs of local government, 30 days before the end of the transitional period. The "right of the Serb community to form a common council of municipalities" is particularly mentioned.

[Kolovrat] How do you comment on the information that more than 500 Serb families from the region of Vojvodina moved into Baranja early this year?

[Knezevic] Everything that has been done against the aforementioned quoted part of the agreement has been done illegally. [passage omitted]

[Kolovrat] Is it, perhaps, for a healthy normalization of relations between the FRY and Croatia, necessary to wait for a change of governments in both countries, or it is possible to achieve that with the present regimes?

[Knezevic] Both countries have legally elected governments and state leaderships who will certainly carry out responsibly, and on the whole, all the international agreements and treaties.

[Kolovrat] In recent days, there has been more and more talk about the possibility of establishing some kind of court in Belgrade, before which the Serbian authorities should bring all the suspected war criminals, and possibly deliver them to the International War Criminal Tribunal in the Hague. Can you tell us anything more specific about that?

[Knezevic] Every war crime and crime committed during a war has to be punished. That is the debt of any country and judicial system in the eyes of international public, and primarily in the name of one's own general public. In that regard, the FRY will be at the level of the historical task, it goes without saying, within the limits of its own Constitution and the whole legal system. The Hague Tribunal and the obligations toward it were also discussed in Dayton. The FRY will do everything it has committed itself to. However, the Hague Tribunal must not be an instrument of political pressure and manipulation. It would simply not be a tribunal then.

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Accusations Against Milosevic Lack Seriousness

[Passage omitted] [Kolovrat] What is your comment on the United States setting 22 officials and 15 agents to work in order to gather documents and evidence to prepare the Hague Tribunal indictment against Slobodan Milosevic?

[Knezevic] Apart from the accuracy of the information, we consider such thoughts, first of all, speculative and with the purpose of possible pressure on the president of Serbia. Such form of pressure, in our opinion, is utterly groundless and unnecessary. After all, the United States has, as is known, verified the role of the president of Serbia in the process of negotiating peace in the territory of former Yugoslavia. The president of Serbia is an active participant, and a respected and inevitable partner in the process of achieving the final peace. We are talking about a mere wish of unserious groups and individuals, which is absolutely collides with Slobodan Milosevic's contribution to peace. [passage omitted]

[Kolovrat] Have you been thinking about staying in Croatia as a full citizen, since you were born here, and you have spent all your years of service in Croatia?

[Knezevic] I can neither forget my native place nor hate the environment where I have lived so long and experienced so much. My parents, three brothers, and sister are buried in Dalmatia, my son's grave is in Zagreb. A man is tied also by graveyards to one place. I will be living in Belgrade, I will often come to Zagreb, as well as to Dalmatia, which is my native place.

FRY: Czech Prime Minister Klaus Arrives for Visit

AU0403155296 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 4 M ar 96

[Report by Jugoslava Zagorac]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] Czech Republic Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus has arrived on a two-day official visit to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This morning, Prime Minister Radoje Kontic and associates met the high-level guest at Surcin Airport. Jugoslava Zagorac has the details:

[Zagorac] After the intoning of national anthems, the two prime ministers carried out an inspection of the Yugoslav Army's honorary platoon. Federal Prime Minister then addressed the assembled journalists. Expressing satisfaction with the first visit of a Czech statesman following the proclamation of the FRY and the Czech Republic, Prime Minister Kontic stressed:

[Kontic] We are particularly honored that the visitor is Mr. Klaus, the reformer of the Czech state and economy, a statesman and politician whom the FRY holds in very high regard because of his objective stance toward the Yugoslav crisis, and his consistent commitment to a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis, and because of his equidistance which he has maintained and continues to maintain toward all the sides involved in the Yugoslav crisis.

We consider Mr. Klaus's visit to be an expression of a desire to develop comprehensive bilateral cooperation with Yugoslavia; for our part, I would like to stress our readiness to develop all forms ...[pauses] not only the revival of former cooperation, but also the development of diverse cooperation. That is why our talks will focus primarily on the creation of conditions for the realization of our set goal. We highly value the fact that the Czech Republic, immediately after the suspension of sanctions, also revoked the law on sanctions against the FRY, and upgraded diplomatic relations in Belgrade to embassy level; in this way, the Czech Republic actually recognized Yugoslavia's continuity.

[Zagorac] We expect, Kontic stressed, that the Czech Republic will help FRY reintegrate into the international community. Addressing the assembled journalists, Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus stressed:

[Klaus, in Czech with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] I have come to continue the traditional Czech-Serb friendship. The Czech Republic was painfully aware of the tragic events on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and attempted to cultivate and maintain an objective, unbiased stance. I am convinced that cooperation between Yugoslavia and the Czech Republic will be comprehensive, and that this visit to Belgrade will be extremely successful. I am truly looking forward to meeting with Yugoslav officials.

[Zagorac] Allow me to remind you that Klaus is the author of the Czech privatization model, which has proven to be the most successful model implemented in a country in transition. Immediately following his arrival in Belgrade, Vaclav Klaus began talks with his host Prime Minister Radoje Kontic. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic is expected to receive Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus in the course of the day.

FRY: Czech Republic's Klaus on Talks With Milosevic

AU0403212896 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 4 Mar 96

[Interview with Czech Republic Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Tatjana Lenard in Belgrade on 4 March—

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recorded; Klaus speaks in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Lenard] You have had a busy day today. What are your impressions?

[Klaus] First, I came here deeply motivated and with great interest in doing something positive regarding Czech-Yugoslav relations, since there has been a void in the past two years with hardly any contact. I think it is time to start over. I came here to demonstrate the Czech Republic's readiness to resume the traditionally very good relations between our two countries. I have to say that in meetings with your politicians—from Prime Minister Kontic, President Milosevic, to Assembly Speaker Radulovic—we discussed many positive things for the future.

[Lenard] Now that the Dayton peace agreement has been signed, what do you think about its implementation?

[Klaus] I hope that the Dayton Agreement is a very good start that will open possibilities for negotiations and finding a final and lasting solution. I must also say that there can be neither peace nor stability in the Balkans without Yugoslavia. This is one of the important things, and we followed with great interest the development of Yugoslav political initiatives in the past few years, particularly in the past two years when we noticed a pragmatic approach. It is my opinion that this pragmatic approach helped.

[Lenard] You are also one of the first countries to have resumed cooperation with us as soon as the sanctions were lifted, that is, suspended. What is the reason for this?

[Klaus] Well, I believe there exists a traditional friendship between our two countries; that is the first reason. The other reason is that it is a mistake to exclude a country or community from the international community. I have always opposed this, and I am glad that the situation has changed over the past few months and weeks.

FRY: Kontic, Czech Republic's Klaus Comment on Talks

LD0503004296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0022 GMT 5 Mar 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 4 (TANJUG)—The Czech Republic will always support the reintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the international community, Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus said late on Monday [4 March].

Speaking at the close of his one-day visit to Belgrade, Klaus gave assurances that the Czech Republic would always be on the side that supports the reintegration of Yugoslavia (Federation of Serbia and Montenegro) in the world community.

Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic said that Klaus's visit, although brief, had been useful and very fruitful, and that promotion of bilateral cooperation had been the chief topic of discussion.

Greatest attention was devoted to the promotion of bilateral economic cooperation, specifically in agriculture, the food, textile, car and wood and timber industries, and ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, Kontic said.

He added that the two sides had agreed it was necessary to coordinate as soon as possible the relevant state regulations, specifically agreements on economic cooperation, avoidance of double taxation and the protection and stimulation of investment.

Kontic said that both sides took the view that all conditions existed for annual trade between Yugoslavia and the Czech Republic to reach one billion dollars in value quite soon. He said that Yugoslavia had proposed abolishing visas, with the Czech side agreeing to abolish visas for diplomatic, service and business passports first. The Czech side agreed without question to a request for a normalisation of the payment of Czech pension benefits to Yugoslavs entitled to them, Kontic added.

The two sides agreed that Yugoslavia must be returned to European associations as soon as possible, he said. Prime Minister Klaus promised personally to support all initiatives for Yugoslavia's reintegration in the international community, Kontic said. He added that this meant a normalisation with the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the European Union, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and other organisations.

Kontic further said that the Yugoslav Government had shown great interest in regional associations, too, such as the Central European initiative and the Visegrad Group, of which the Czech Republic is a member.

Vaclav Klaus leaves for Zagreb on Tuesday.

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FRY: Paper Faults Information Minister's 'Capriciousness'

AU0503190996 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 5 Mar 96 p 4

[Statement by NASA BORBA editorial board: Apology to the readers—"NASA BORBA Cannot Enter Federation Palace"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We wish to apologize to our readers for not having a report in today's issue on last night's news conference by Czech Republic Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus.

The reason is always the same when it comes to news conferences held in the Federation Palace—NASA BORBA cannot report from this institution since its reporters are not given accreditation.

This was what we were told yesterday by a female voice, stressing that "she was only a clerk and passing on what she had been told." What she was told had been said at the beginning of last year, when Federal Information Minister Dragutin Brcin became editor in chief of BORBA, and his ill-fated reporters launched NASA BORBA. Since then the doors to the Federation Palace have been closed to NASA BORBA. We can accept the "discretionary right" of a minister to decide who will cover his government's work and who will not.

However, when a daily is prevented from covering a visit by a foreign prime minister and reporting from his news conference, then it is much more than a discretionary right, and exceeds into the sphere of personal (ministerial) capriciousness for which in normal countries one can be taken to court.

FRY: Friendship, Cooperation Accord Signed With Belarus

LD0503183496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1823 GMT 5 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 5 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav government approved at a session on Tuesday [5 March] the text of an agreement on friendship and cooperation between Yugoslavia and Belarus and pointed to its high importance ahead of an official visit by Yugoslav President Zoran Lilic to Belarus on March 6-9.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Belarus have decided to sign an agreement on friendship and cooperation on the basis of traditionally friendly relations between the two peoples, the two countries and their historical, cultural and spiritual close bonds, the government said in a statement.

The statement said that the two countries were firmly resolved to jointly act with a view to erecting a free and democratic Europe, based on democratic values and respect for human rights, and that they were convinced that cooperation was in the interest of both countries and would contribute to strengthening peace and security in Europe.

In keeping with the general principles and international law norms defined by the U.N. charter, the Helsinki final document, the Paris Charter for New Europe, the documents of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and international obligations on human rights, Yugoslavia and Belarus are firmly resolved to promote and intensify all positive achievements in bilateral relations, the statement said.

Ahead of Lilic's visit to Belarus, the Yugoslav government has defined the basis for the conclusion of a Yugoslav-Belarus agreement on trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation and the setting up of a joint inter-government commission for trade and economic cooperation.

FRY: President Leaves for Official Visit to Belarus

LD0603104096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0955 GMT 6 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 6 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav President Zoran Lilic on Wednesday [6 March] left for an official visit to Belarus at the invitation of Belarus President Alyaksandr Lukashenka.

The first top-level Yugoslav visit to traditionally friendly Belarus is a result of mutual interest in the promotion of comprehensive bilateral relations and cooperation in all fields.

Lilic's visit to Belarus will end on March 9.

A number of intergovernmental agreements will be signed during the visit, which will spur on the establishment of primarily economic ties and promotion of concrete projects for economic cooperation.

This will create a legal basis for a speedier promotion of Yugoslavia's cooperation with Belarus, which is considered an important partner in Belgrade.

The visit will represent an opportunity to discuss current developments in Europe and the Balkans and prospects for the consolidation of peace, cooperation and stability.

The Yugoslav delegation also includes Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic, Trade Minister Djordje Siradovic and Assistant Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic.

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A group of businessmen also left for Minsk to establish contacts with Belarus partners.

FRY: Defense Minister Meets With New Russian Envoy

LD0503200796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1846 GMT 5 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 5 (TANJUG)—Newly-appointed ambassador of the Russian Federation in Belgrade stated Tuesday [5 March], in a talk with Yugoslav Defence Minister Pavle Bulatovic, that Russia would do its best for the soonest possible reintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (F.R.Y.) into international organizations or institutions.

The Defence Ministry said that Bulatovic pointed out that a fresh stage was emerging in Russia-F.R.Y. relations during which cooperation should be intensified in the field of economy, sciences and technology, culture, and defence.

Kotov stressed he regarded a durable peace in the Balkans as one of the most significant tasks in his mission.

The Dayton/Paris accords accounted for a solid political foundation for the triumph of peace, but they still left behind a large number of what he called "delayed-action mines" which "must not be allowed to blow up."

FRY: Cuban Envoy Views Renewal of Economic Cooperation

LD0403174696 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1653 GMT 4 Mar 96

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 4 (TANJUG)—Members of a Cuban delegation, headed by Assembly Vice-President Jaime Crombet, conferred in Belgrade on Monday [4 March] with Yugoslav economists and businessmen at the Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce on the renewal of economic cooperation.

The talks Cuba's debts to Yugoslav firms and it was proposed that the debts be written off through deliveries of sugar, coffee, nickel, and certain food products.

Cuba is interested in importing transport facilities, processing equipment, medical instruments, and other similar goods from Yugoslavia.

Crombet said economic relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were of great importance for Cuba, because the two countries had had long-term fruitful cooperation.

As a result of foreign blockade, Cuba had the biggest economic crisis in its history in the past five years, just like the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, so that it is all the more important for the widest possible economic exchange to begin, Crombet said.

Crombet explained the essence of the economic reforms which had been implemented in Cuba in the past two and a half years, making it possible for market mechanisms to be introduced into the planned economy. Conditions have been created for Cuba to join in world trade, but the stepping up of the economic blockade, as announced by the United States, might be a major obstacle.

The United States imposed an economic blockade of Cuba in 1962. The decision is still in effect.

FRY: Transport Minister Meets With Iranian Delegation

LD0503202596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1858 GMT 5 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 5 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Minister of Transport and Communications Zoran Vujovic received on Tuesday [5 March] a delegation of the Ministry of Roads and Transport of the Islamic Republic of Iran headed by Deputy Minister Nedzad Sa'idi, the Yugoslav Ministry of Information said in a statement.

The two sides agreed that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had played an important role in restoring peace in the Former Yugoslavia, which has paved the way for economic cooperation between interested partners.

The Iranian delegation said that it was a priority to speedily restore cooperation in the field of transport and communications, particularly road transport, which was very intensive before the beginning of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Iran favours a speedy implementation of an inter-state agreement on road transport signed in 1989.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has thus confirmed the continuity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a reality.

Expert-level talks are held at the Yugoslav Ministry of Transport and Communications on the use and ways of use of a road corridor through Yugoslavia towards central and Western Europe.

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FRY: Official Views SFRY Succession Issue

AU0403161696 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 25 Feb 96 pp 11-12

[Interview with Kosta Mihailovic, head of the Yugoslav Working Group for Succession, by Spasenija Vujosevic; place and date not given: "The Continuity of Yugoslavia Is of Political Importance; It Does Not Bring Economic Privileges"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The search for regulation of the consequences of the secession of some parts of the former Yugoslav federation and granting the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia the political continuity is now entering a new stage. The present moment in the negotiations on the succession is principally interesting because the conference on the former Yugoslavia was abolished at the end of January, and the council for the implementation of Peace, which is being established now, has not yet taken over its role as an international mediator. This break is a good occasion to summarize the work done on the succession so far and certain experiences that could be valuable for the future mediator in making the work more efficient. This was the reason why POLITIKA asked Mr. Kosta Mihailovic, the head of the Yugoslav delegation in the Working Group for Succession of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, to give an interview for POLITIKA's readers and answer some basic questions about the work of the Succession Group. [passage omitted]

[Vujosevic] Has the different approach to the continuity been an insurmountable obstacle in achieving an agreement on state property?

[Mihailovic] The FRY has on several occasions pointed out that the continuity has both political and legal importance for it. It has waived the economic privileges that are its due as the predecessor country according to international law. Thus, the property would be divided according to the principle of legal equity. To judge from newspaper reports, France has taken the same attitude.

[Vujosevic] France has rejected Badenter and his commission [on the EU's recognition of former Yugoslav states] by supporting the idea that Yugoslavia should be granted continuity. Is this of any practical importance?

[Mihailovic] France did not feel happy about disavowing the chairman of the State Council. But considerations toward the person had to give way to the fact that Badenter's opinion, which was politically motivated and biased, was an increasingly heavy burden on the efforts to resolve the Yugoslav crisis. If the negotiations on all the controversial issues, and not only the succession, are freed from that burden, the greatest hurdle for the achievement of a general agreement between the FRY and the newly established states will be removed.

[Vujosevic] Are the existing differences between the two proposals a result of a disagreement over the working method, or is agreement on the working method simply not being sufficiently respected?

[Mihailovic] The aim of the working method, which was approved by the acceptance of a written proposal by the Ambassador Do Vale [name as transliterated], was to define the terms, to establish the criteria, to set down principles, and to resolve questions of methodology. Neither as the organizer of the work and the meetings nor as one of the two proposers of the agreement did the Secretariat of the Group for Succession adhere to the working method that was agreed upon, unlike the Yugoslav side, which tried to stick consistently to what was agreed upon, at all stages of the work as well as in its proposal for an agreement.

The Crucial Mistake

[Mihailovic continues] As the organizer of the work, the Secretariat made the crucial mistake of not insisting on the redefinition of the term "state property" as the object of settlement. This form of property only existed in the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia until 1953, when the confusing "social property" became the dominant property form. Having not done this, the Secretariat went astray, both in the organization of the work and in its proposals for the agreement. A redefinition should have been made so as to be able to establish beyond all doubt what will enter the inventory of the property, without making subjective and improvised assessments. But, since this was not made, the parties had to bid for which property should enter the inventory. Every side was entitled to propose and challenge the proposal of every other side. It was impossible to reach an agreement on that subjective basis, not only between Yugoslavia and the four secessionist republics, but the secessionist republics failed to reach an agreement between themselves, either. This procedure was welcomed by the Secretariat and it determined at its own discretion what would enter the inventory, which methodology would be applied for the evaluation of every single inventory item, and, naturally, what would be the key to arriving at any settlement.

[Vujosevic] What is the Yugoslav position on the second part of the agreement by the Succession Group Secretariat?

[Mihailovic] To judge from the information that foreign reporters have—it cannot be reliably claimed that the Yugoslav delegation has this—the Secretariat's proposal is extremely discriminating against Yugoslavia. This

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was noticed by Mrs. F. Hartmann, a journalist, who wrote in LE MONDE on 10 February 1996: "According to French diplomatic sources, a group of experts have foreseen that only 5 percent of the assets should come into the possession of the FRY. It is a very small proportion for a state that has almost a half of the population of the former Yugoslavia (10.4 million out of the 23.4 million of the former Yugoslavia), but this is explained by the fact that the FRY inherited the largest part of the property of the former Yugoslav People's Army." The problem is not only that the FRY should get no more than 5 percent of the assets, but that it should accept over 68 percent of the liabilities!

Unknown Methodology

[Mihailovic continues] The Yugoslav side received the second part of the proposal by the Succession Group's Secretariat informally, but we are not sure whether or not some changes may have been made in the meantime. Therefore it is not possible to give full and clear comments, especially because the methodology on which the proposal is based is not accessible. It can reliably be claimed, however, that the basic drawback of the proposal is that its starting point is an arbitrary inventory and an inadequate key for the distribution of property.

[Vujosevic] What is the Yugoslav proposal based on?

[Mihailovic] First of all, the term "state property" has been redefined in the Yugoslav proposal by introducing the principle of equity, which means that the settlement must deal with all investments made with joint capital. This principle would be applied in any case, even if the term "state property" did not have to be redefined. In this way it has not only been defined correctly and objectively what should enter the inventory, but the social and economic reality of the SFRY has been respected, too, since joint investments and common development used to be dominant there. It is only logical that the inventory should include the large property distributed throughout the SFRY. The Yugoslav proposal contains a methodology for valuation and a key for distribution. It excludes the possibility of an unjustified accumulation of wealth. According to the proposal, with the starting point being the average investment per capita, the FRY should have good chances.

[Vujosevic] Who is refusing to consider the Yugoslav proposal and why? [Mihailovic] The four secessionist republics, for the simple reason that they prefer the proposal of the Succession Group's Secretariat, since it is more favorable for them. They are being backed by the Secretariat itself. This is even more strange, since the Secretariat suggested that the Yugoslav delegation make its own version of the proposal for an agreement in December 1993. When the proposal was submitted to the Secretariat several months later, the Secretariat did all it could to circumvent it. [passage omitted]

[Vujosevic] The second part of the proposal made by the Succession Group's Secretariat was completed in 1994, but it has not been officially submitted to the parties yet. How do you explain this procedure?

[Mihailovic] The hiding of the second part of the agreement together with the methodology is explained with consultations held with influential countries. There is the impression that political support has been obtained that will make it possible to impose the Secretariat's proposal, by which the examination of its equity and professional foundation will be avoided.

[Vujosevic] What is the main impediment that you see on the way to an agreement?

[Mihailovic] It is the opinion of the secessionist republics that they will obtain their unjust demands because of the benevolence of the international community. As long as the international community also has double standards on the succession issue, as can be seen in its biased proposals, behind which lie the secessionist republics expectations that these proposals will be imposed on the FRY, with or without the use of force, the secessionist republics will not be ready to accept rational criticism or compromises.

[Vujosevic] Does the establishment of the Council for the Implementation of Peace, which will be in charge of the succession, mean that the work will be resumed at the point where it was suspended, or should new ways and possibilities be sought for more efficient solutions to the succession problem? [Mihailovic] The establishment of the Council raises the question of how to resume further work on the succession. The greatest dilemma is certainly whether to continue at the point where we stopped or to assess the work accomplished so far as unsuccessful and reach a just solution with a new philosophy, a new attitude toward the problem, and new experts.

[Vujosevic] Where would resuming the work at the point at which it was suspended lead?

[Mihailovic] B. Marendic, the head of the Croatian delegation, should answer this question. In NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA of 26 January 1996, he supported the idea that the Council should resume the work at the point at which it was suspended. In his opinion, the FRY is not willing to accept the proposal made by the Succession Group Secretariat (and it is probably right!). It is being demanded directly of the UN Security Council to order the FRY to accept the above-mentioned proposal or to do so by an appropriate resolution.

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Marendic's Scenario

[Mihailovic continues] Leaving aside the possibility that in the event that it is not possible to reach an agreement, the parties will have to go to an arbitration court, Marendic's scenario of resuming the work at the point at which it was suspended is quite clear: The UN Security Council should be forced to exert pressure on the FRY, thus bringing the complicated task to an end in a way that suits the secessionist republics. This would be an advantage for the authors of the proposal too, since there would be no more opportunity to discuss the Yugoslav proposal and the Secretariat's proposal would not be reconsidered from the professional point of view, so all of its drawbacks would remain uncovered and indisputable.

[Vujosevic] What should be changed to make the work on succession successful?

[Mihailovic] The most important thing is for the Council to have the same attitude toward all the parties, which has not been the case so far. The Council should behave as a mediator and not impose solutions that favor one or other party. No secessionist republic has made its own proposal and this should be required of them. A confrontation of proposals should then be made so as to see on what points the parties agree and where they disagree. The role of the mediator should be to find reasonable solutions and compromises. A new team of experts is necessary for this task.

[Vujosevic] Does the Yugoslav delegation insist exclusively on its proposal for the regulation of the consequences of the secession and on a multilateral agreement, or does it also allow alternative options and negotiations at a bilateral level?

[Mihailovic] The Yugoslav delegation is convinced that its proposal is just, since it has been made on the basis of original documentation and correct methodology. Its validity may be checked from the professional point of view. This proposal is objective and it takes into consideration the interests of all parties. This is why Yugoslav delegation is sticking by its proposal. But it is ready to consider the proposal of other delegations, too, on condition that they are based on the principle of equity and that they take the interests of all parties into consideration. Unfortunately, we have not yet received any such proposal. The Yugoslav delegation is also open to bilateral agreements and it is ready to accept them if they facilitate the search for a solution to how to solve the secession problem. In other words, the Yugoslav delegation is open to all options that take into account an equitable fulfillment of all parties' interests.

Gold—A Responsibility of the State

[Vujosevic] The Zagreb press is publishing statements by the presidents of the National Bank of Croatia and the National Bank of Slovenia that, at the meeting of the national banks' presidents of the former Yugoslav states, only the sharing out of the gold reserves and nothing else will be discussed. Is this true?

[Mihailovic] Even if the other bank presidents do not know it, President Avramovic knows very well that the division of the gold, like any other property, is one of the responsibilities of the state, that is the Yugoslav Succession Group, and not a responsibility of the national banks. As a man of initiative and ideas, President Avramovic is interested in talks on the promotion of economic relations and financial cooperation.

[Vujosevic] The four secessionist republics hold meetings at which they discuss how to act collectively on the international scene. What is your opinion about that kind of cooperation?

[Mihailovic] The situation with which they are confronted as a result of the secession forces the four republics to cooperate and to try to impose through political manipulations unjust solutions to Yugoslavia and disturb its payment transactions in the interregnum period between the abolition of the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and the establishment of the Council. The basis for their cooperation is very thin and problematic, however, because it relies on the bias of international bodies. There are no deeper motives for that cooperation. Slovenia, which is relatively developed owing to its heritage and its economic situation, cannot have and does not have the same interests as the underdeveloped Macedonia [the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] or Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Box, p 12]

What Does the Yugoslav Proposal Contain?

The Draft Agreement on the Regulation of the Consequences of the Secession of Some Parts of the Yugoslav Federation contains, in addition to a preamble, eight chapters with 33 articles. Apart from that, the Draft Agreement includes two more sections. An inventory of the SFRY's state property is contained in the first section and a methodology for its verification in the second. The key for the settlement is at the end. After the preamble there follows, in Chapter II, an explanation of the terms used in the draft agreement. In a), the term "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" is, for example, defined as the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia in a smaller territory; in b), it is suggested that the term

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"newly established state" should be used for the parts that seceded from the SFRY. Chapter II treats the regulation of the citizenship of SFRY citizens residing in the newly established states and, in Chapter III, it is proposed how the rights and pensions of all former citizens should be regulated.

The solution to the problem of the legal effectiveness of the agreements signed on behalf of the SFRY is proposed in Chapter IV, whereas Chapter V defines the term "state archives of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia" and the way for them to be used, since there are three types of archives: The state archives necessary for the normal functioning of the FRY, those which represent the historical and cultural heritage of Yugoslavia, and those necessary for the normal functioning of the newly established states. In Chapter VI it is proposed how to define state property, and in Chapter VII how to resolve disputes. The concluding stipulations propose how the agreement should take effect, as well as solutions to other issues necessary for the implementation of the agreement. The inventory of the SFRY's state property, which has been submitted to the Working Group for the Succession of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, comprises 9,054 items classified in three main groups.

The first group includes real estates including 8,116 items, the second movable property with 460 items, and the third financial and other rights and liabilities with 388 items. This inventory includes items financed on the basis of the decision taken by appropriate federal bodies and those financed from the federal budget, the general investment fund, the fund for the reconstruction of the country, from international loans, reparations, and other sources. The "sources" include the exemption from federal turnover taxes, federal customs duties, and other export and import duties, various sources of federal public loans, and federal funds established for special purposes.

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